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The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to have conceded 
that environmental issues are an area in which people may publicly challenge 
governmental and commercial actions; however, the movement does not yet appear to 
have undergone a significant, positive change of scale. This thesis proposes that, as the 
environmental movement continues to grow in size and legitimacy, the CCP will 
continue to co-opt these protests, using them to maintain its political monopoly. Yet, the 
increased dissemination of information may slowly allow China’s civil society to 
coalesce and reach past local barriers. This research takes a closer look at environmental 
protests reported over a ten-year timespan, where they occurred, the issues protested, and 
whether they have affected Chinese society and politics. Due to an inability to access 
primary sources on Chinese protests, this thesis covers only some of the broad, macro-
level trends visible through the lens of these secondary sources. Nevertheless, it 
concludes that the number of reported incidents of protest is growing, and their influence 
is felt throughout civil society.  
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China is a semi-authoritarian country well known in the West for its censorship 
and poor human rights record, yet despite these realities, the number of street protests is 
growing. Many of these protests focus on the environment and center on not-in-my-
backyard (NIMBY) issues. Why does the Chinese central government allow these 
environmental protests, sometimes even siding against local authorities who back the 
projects? Further, even as some environmental concerns are vehemently protested, 
others—such as air quality in Beijing or the poor water quality of China’s waterways—
seem less contentious. Why do some projects draw hundreds or thousands of protestors 
while others quietly die out? 
Arguably, the environment as an issue appears less threatening to the CCP’s 
political legitimacy than many other issues of potential social mobilization, such as labor 
disputes or land seizure and relocation.1 In part, this may explain why the government 
appears tolerant of environmental activism and protests against local governments or 
individual companies.2 Several of these environmental protests have recently resulted in 
government concessions,3 but at other times and locations, the government has held 
firm.4 Where are protests occurring? Why are they reported more frequently in some 
locations, but less in others? Are environmental protests succeeding in a way that 
individuals will be emboldened beyond environmental issue? Does the growth of 
reported protests indicate a more active and visible civil society in China? This thesis will 
address these important questions. 
                                                 
1 Liu Jianqiang, “China’s New ‘Middle Class’ Environmental Protests,” ChinaFile, January 2, 2013, 
http://www.chinafile.com/chinas-new-middle-class-environmental-protests. 
2 “Volatile Atmosphere,” Economist, April 4, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2014/04/environmental-protest-china. 
3 Samuel Wade, “Protests Win Written Pledge of Uranium Plant’s Cancellation,” China Digital Times 
(CDT), accessed November 7, 2014, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/07/protests-win-written-pledge-of-
uranium-plants-cancellation/. 
4 Austin Ramzy, “Chinese Environmentalists Lose Fight to Stop Nu River Dams,” TIME, accessed 
November 7, 2014, http://world.time.com/2013/02/05/chinese-environmentalists-lose-fight-to-stop-nu-
river-dams/. 
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If civil society is growing more confident, will this more vibrant civil society 
continue to support the government or will growing confidence lead to challenging the 
political legitimacy of current leaders? In post-Soviet Eastern Europe, the environmental 
movements served as “an alternative channel for popular protest against the communist 
regimes.”5 Multiple organizations and philosophies coalesced under the banner of 
environmentalism. These social movements then “acted as a catalyst for a wider 
democratization…that toppled autocratic regimes”;6 however, once the movements had 
successfully overthrown the government, the movements lost momentum.7 It took years 
for the environmental movement to reappear as a more focused and professional 
movement. In contrast, the environmental movement in China remains fragmented and 
localized but is increasingly focused, if only on local issues, and professional. The further 
development of larger networks and national protests might be one indicator of a major 
shift in the Chinese political environment.8 The environmental movement in China 
appears to be developing in reverse of the development of similar movements in Eastern 
Europe.9 This chapter describes the history and theory of civil society in early China; 
offers a brief literature review of social movement theory and China’s environmental 
activism; and explains the general problem and hypothesis of this thesis.  
A. CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA 
Economic growth in China over the last two or more decades has given rise to a 
new Chinese middle class. Despite a growing and increasingly affluent middle class, the 
population has chosen political quiescence, focusing instead on the environment and right 
to private property.10 Since the 1989 student demonstrations, no major opposition to the 
                                                 
5 Peter Ho, “Greening Without Conflict? Environmentalism, NGOs and Civil Society in China,” 
Development and Change 32, no. 5 (November 1, 2001): 896, doi:10.1111/1467-7660.00231. 
6 Peter Ho and Richard Louis Edmonds, “Perspectives of Time and Change: Rethinking Embedded 
Environmental Activism in China,” China Information 21, no. 2 (July 1, 2007): 332, 
doi:10.1177/0920203X07079649. 
7 Ibid., 338. 
8 Ibid., 339. 
9 Ibid., 338. 
10 “The Other Moore’s Law,” The Economist, February 12, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/13063306. 
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Chinese state has confronted the status quo. The lack of opposition can be confused with 
a lack of civil society, but while civil society in China is localized, disconnected, and has 
chosen not to directly challenge the state’s political legitimacy, it does exist. The growing 
development of civil society appears to be tolerated and even encouraged in specific, 
limited segments of society. This limited sphere includes social welfare, the environment, 
and other sectors where the government has chosen to withdraw from direct management. 
This section briefly traces and compares the concept of civil society through both the 
West and in Confucian society. 
Civil society is a vague concept often conjuring varying interpretations and 
impressions. The earliest concept of civil society comes from the ancient Greeks who 
envisioned a society “in which the law [bound] state and citizens together and they 
exercise[ed] the ‘virtue of civility,’ the hallmark of good citizenship.”11 Using this 
definition, “‘civility’ means moderating particular, individual, or parochial interests and 
giving precedence to the common good.”12 The idea of “good citizenship” and “civility” 
contrasts with the modern understanding of civil society, which “reflects the desire to 
curb the power of overweening states through a sphere of social organizations enjoying 
more or less autonomy from the state.”13 The study of Western civil society is “an 
attempt to define a type of relationship between state and society,” separating the state 
and society into two separate and distinct areas containing definable boundaries with a 
specifiable relationship.14 “Civil society” often refers to the area between these two 
spheres and “denotes an associational realm in which autonomous organizations are 
formed through voluntary association to represent the interests and aspirations of 
members of society.”15 Though the modern concept of civil society has drastically shifted 
from the original conception in the West, the shift has been less dramatic in China.
                                                 
11 Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic, eds., Civil Society in China, Studies on Contemporary China 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 51. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Gordon White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China: A Case Study of Xiaoshan City,” The 




 Contrary to the Western notion of civil society, which focuses on the individual 
and seeks to separate state and society, Chinese civil society can be viewed as an 
intermediary between society and the state.16 Closer to the early Greek concept of civil 
society, Chinese civil society flows from Confucian traditions of harmonization which 
“favors harmonizing the individual with society, and doing so within the larger moral 
good of harmonizing society with the state.”17 The concept of “good citizenship” can be 
seen in the recently revived Confucian view of harmony.18 Echoes of “civility” can be 
seen in the East Asian concept of corporatism. This tradition of corporatism “stresses the 
vertical integration of ordinary people who surrender their political voice to their 
elites…[and] has been a characteristic structure of Chinese society in the imperial period 
and beyond.”19 Under the combined auspices of harmonization and corporatism, the 
“Chinese have recurrently formed communities that are neither under the direction of the 
state nor bound to such state functions as revenue extraction,”20 thus meeting the modern 
strictures of being autonomous and voluntary. These associations are not always 
recognized as such, because they are often formed “out of [the state’s] sight and, 
sometimes in tandem with (even in cooperation with) state interventions at the local 
level.”21 
Although Chinese civil society more closely resembles the Greek concept than the 
modern Western concept, it also shows elements of the modern definition. Separating 
civil society into distinct categories and then comparing each category to China, one can 
clearly see both similarities and differences. Although not all-inclusive, one way to 
examine the Western concept of civil society is to break it into three distinct categories: 
political society, mass organizations in opposition to the state, and intermediate social 
                                                 
16 Philip C. C. Huang, “‘Public Sphere’/‘Civil Society’ in China?: The Third Realm between State and 
Society,” Modern China 19, no. 2 (April 1, 1993): 225. 
17 Brook and Frolic, Civil Society in China, 43. 
18 Ian Johnson, “Hu Jintao Takes U.S. a Message of Harmony,” New York Times, January 18, 2011, 
sec. World / Asia Pacific, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/world/asia/19hu.html. 
19 Brook and Frolic, Civil Society in China, 23. 
20 Ibid., 22. 
21 Ibid. 
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associations.22 The first category, political society, focuses on the ability and inclination 
of a society toward democratization, particularly along liberal lines.23 The focus on 
liberalization and democratization is threatening to the CCP; therefore, any organization 
that gains prominence that might challenge the status quo, such as the China Democratic 
Party, is immediately shut down.24 This aspect of civil society is not a part of current 
Chinese society, and may not develop until there is a drastic change in political 
environment. Similar to political society, mass organizations in direct and open 
opposition to the state are also lacking in China. Organizations that gain enormous 
popularity or are perceived a threat to the state draw the most notice from the state. These 
organizations are then severely restricted or ruthlessly suppressed. 
The final category, intermediate social associations, is the most inclusive of the 
categories and loosely stems from a Hegelian model of society, which focuses on familial 
or relational ties formed in society.25 These ties include lawful organizations, unlawful 
organizations such as gangs or triads, and the so-called “bourgeois society,” which rises 
alongside a market economy and is “linked to the world of cities or towns.”26 While, 
historically, bourgeois society has been absent in China, there was a temporary growth of 
associations under the early twentieth century growth of cities and market forces, until 
the devastation of war and the rise of the CCP delayed the advent of such a group until 
the end of the twentieth century. 
In China, the intermediate social association definition, specifically associations 
and ties that form between state and society, blends into the Confucian traditions of 
harmonization. These ties form a relational “third realm” between the state and the 
private sphere.27 This relational third realm is in direct opposition to the Western notion 
                                                 
22 White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China,” 65–7. 
23 Ibid., 65–6. 
24 Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, 
Second Edition (Cornell University Press, 2004), 133–4. 
25 White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China,” 66. 
26 Ibid., 60. 
27 Huang, “‘Public Sphere’/‘Civil Society’ in China?,” 225. 
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of civil society that “presupposes a dichotomous opposition between state and society.”28 
Because the evolution of civil society in the West evolved in the contested area between 
state and society, it grew when in opposition to the state.29 The Western understanding of 
civil society shifted during the creation of nation-states in Europe and society is now seen 
as superior to the state; such superiority theoretically leads to democracy.30 The concept 
of civil society competing against the state leading to democracy was further entrenched 
in social science theory during the revolutions of the late-1990s in the post-Soviet 
states.31  
Instead of a radical shift away from the Greek concepts of “good citizenship” and 
“civility” in the West, traditional Chinese civil society developed as an intermediary with 
the goal of harmonization that continues today. This concept can be seen in both the legal 
system and local administration. National state control throughout Chinese history has 
often been weak. Therefore, during the Imperial era, local elites were given specific 
tasks, primarily collecting taxes and providing public service, in return for status and 
served as the foundation for this intermediary role.32 Similarly, the Imperial court system, 
specifically civil adjudication, was often handled before it actually reached the courts. If 
private mediation between friends or family failed, the plaintiff would file suit and then 
in a semi-open forum of the town or village the judges would discuss the suit.33 These 
discussions, which often led to a successfully mediated settlement, focused on 
compromise conducted via mediation rather than an institutionalized process.34 Because 
this tradition of private mediation often involved the entire town and worked outside the 
Imperial court system, civil society developed in the space between state and society. The 
goal was to work out differences and arrive at a harmonious compromise before 
involving the state. 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 216. 
29 Ibid., 219. 
30 Brook and Frolic, Civil Society in China, 23. 
31 Ho and Edmonds, “Perspectives of Time and Change,” 332. 
32 Huang, “‘Public Sphere’/‘Civil Society’ in China?,” 227. 
33 Ibid., 226–7. 
34 Ibid. 
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As the Qing government collapsed and gave way, first, to a Republic, and then 
Warlordism, an urban market economy evolved. As the market economy began to 
emerge, people flocked to towns and cities where new associations grew and were 
normalized.35 During this period civil society flourished, not in opposition to the state, 
but rather complementarily, due to a lack of state capacity. The Republican period also 
saw many political organizations formed and a nascent political society was developed 
for a brief span.36 It was these budding associations that were later shut down and 
destroyed under Mao. In 1949, many of the civil society organizations that had survived 
the war and focused on charity and reconstruction were either coopted by the Party or 
shutdown once the CCP was entrenched.37  
Since the start of the reform and opening era under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, civil 
society has grown to fill the emerging gaps between the state and the individual. This has 
usually taken the form of “official” organizations, controlled and led by Party cadre and 
funded from the state; “semi-official” organizations that often take advantage as personal 
or guanxi networks; or “purely popular” organizations.38 The first two categories of 
organization form a second style of civil society not often recognized, and best described 
as state-led civil society. “State-led civil society unites two strands of authoritarian 
politics: those of the socialist authoritarian state in transition, and those of the ascendant 
East Asian communitarian state.”39 Chapter II will trace the history of civil society in 
modern China. 
The final category, purely popular organizations, includes organizations that are 
mainly autonomous but subject to a variety of regulations. Such organizations include 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In China, the evolution of NGOs, especially 
environmental non-government organizations (ENGOs), have been an exercise of two 
steps forward and one step back. During the reform era, in the mid-1970s a small scale 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 229. 
36 Brook and Frolic, Civil Society in China, 41. 
37 Karla W. Simon, Civil Society in China: The Legal Framework from Ancient Times to the New 
Reform Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 146. 
38 White, “Prospects for Civil Society in China,” 75. 
39 Brook and Frolic, Civil Society in China, 56. 
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effort at environmental protection began, but the level of decentralization allowed 
provincial and local elites to focus on economic concerns without concern for 
environmental issues. The integration into the global economy further exacerbated the 
problem as heavy industries relocated to take advantage of cheap labor and areas with 
loose regulation.40  
As the economy grows, Chinese civil society is slowly becoming both more 
recognizable to Western observers and more willing to confront the government. Some of 
the new willingness to seek confrontation is a result of changing social norms and a 
newly entitled generation of bourgeois Chinese middle class.41 As society becomes more 
empowered, people may gain greater confidence in their ability to confront the 
government and succeed. By confronting the government only in areas that are not 
overtly political, “embeddedness buys time for civic organizations to consolidate and 
institutionalize.”42 Whether this strategy is intentional or simply a product of the system, 
it appears to be working. “Contrary to the vision of [Western] public sphere/civil society 
models, actual sociopolitical change in China has really never come from any lasting 
assertion of societal autonomy against the state, but rather from the workings out of state-
society relations.”43 Therefore, China’s embedded environmentalism has developed as a 
negotiated symbiosis between the state and environmentalists carved out by 
understanding that the state and society are not in direct conflict and specifically within 
the context of the environmental movement, embeddedness serves an example Huang’s 
“third realm.”44 This negotiated interaction, embeddedness, or “third realm” between 
state and society has largely developed due to the semi-authoritarian nature of the 
Chinese state.45  
                                                 
40 Economy, The River Runs Black, 63. 
41 “Beneath the Glacier,” Economist, April 12, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21600747-spite-political-clampdown-flourishing-civil-society-
taking-hold-beneath-glacier. 
42 Ho and Edmonds, “Perspectives of Time and Change,” 338. 
43 Huang, “‘Public Sphere’/‘Civil Society’ in China?,” 238. 
44 Ibid., 223–6. 
45 Ho and Edmonds, “Perspectives of Time and Change,” 334. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The semi-authoritarian nature of the Chinese state and its integration into the 
international system are constant sources of speculation and interest. A relatively recent 
period of reinvigorated scholarship is beginning to focus on modern China’s civil society 
and growing concern in regards to the global environment is focusing increased attention 
on China’s environmental policies. The focus of this thesis is on the modern development 
of civil society and environmentalism in China and the interaction between these two 
topics. To help explain the interaction between the nascent environmental movement and 
the broader civil society, this thesis uses the framework of qualitative data analysis and 
its relation to the broader social movement theory framework. 
The following sections will follow introduce some of the broader theories and 
literature that underpins this thesis. First, the section on social movement theory will 
focus on the broader definitions and theories regarding why people protest. While social 
movement theory looks at general, universal theories behind why people protest, the 
second section, on environmental activism, focuses on the tools that are unique in China. 
Chapter II will than trace the evolution of both environment regulations and Chinese civil 
society in greater detail.  
1. Social Movement Theory 
Social movement theory covers a variety of movements under all types of 
governments. This thesis focuses on the growing social movement under China’s semi-
authoritarian regime, particularly how it formed despite state opposition. As the world 
grows increasingly connected and people are better able to overcome the barrier of 
physical distance, the CCP must walk a fine line between coercion and incentive when 
dealing with social movements.  
People may protest for a variety of reasons and against a variety of injustices, real 
or perceived. The stated reason for a protest must resonate with protestors, but the cause 
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may simply be an excuse to rally when the true grievance is believed to be unassailable.46 
As a society changes and comes under internal pressure, mobilization against one 
perceived injustice often serves as an outlet for an underlying issue that either cannot be 
expressed or properly demonstrated against.47 Such changes or pressures can include a 
change of population demographics or economic uncertainty.48  
In order to be considered a social movement there are four elements required: 
organization, temporal continuity, change-oriented goals, and extra-institutional action 
(protest, riot, etc.).49 The degree of organization required may be low, but to be 
considered a movement, there must be people working in concert with each other and 
connected, not solely acting “in a parallel but disconnected manner,”50 which would 
describe social trends such as industrialization or urbanization.51 The condition of 
temporal continuity is used to separate singular protests or riots from movements, which 
assume a series of related actions.52  
Although the third condition is change-oriented goals, the level or change of scale 
is not fixed to a specific threshold but a continuum of change. At their most fundamental 
level, all organizations can be divided into one of two categories, norm-oriented or value-
oriented. “Norm-oriented movements are concerned with producing more limited but 
specific changes within a social system”53 and will often attempt to work from within the 
system, pushing boundaries and resorting to extra-institutional action only as a last result. 
By contrast, value-oriented movements are “concerned with more fundamental change, 
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and thus seek to alter basic values and the institutional bedrock on which they rest.”54 
Examples of value-oriented movements include most revolutions and civil rights 
movements. 
A more granular way of dividing social movements orients them across two axes: 
scale and scope of change. Scale refers to the focus of movement on the individual or 
society, while scope refers to the goals of a movement, limited or total. These two axes 
are combined into four types of movement. An alternative movement is one that “seek[s] 
partial change in individuals”55 and is best illustrated by the U.S. self-help movement. A 
redemptive movement also focuses on individuals but seeks total vice limited change 
(i.e., cults).56 A reformative movement is one that seeks to change society but only in a 
limited manner, challenging a specific and limited perceived wrong, such as the feminist 
movement, the LGBT movement, etc.57 The final and most all-encompassing category is 
the transformative movement, which may also be called a revolution.58 
While the scope of a movement may be claimed to be either limited or total, the 
practical scope of a movement’s influence is developed through interaction between 
participants and the state or another authority. According to Charles Tilly, in order for a 
movement to form there must be either political opportunity or credible threat. 
Opportunity is defined as “the likelihood that challengers will enhance their interest or 
extend existing benefits if they act collectively,”59 and threat is “the probability that 
existing benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to 
act collectively.”60 
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This combination of opportunity and the impending increased threat (in the face 
of inaction) appears especially clear in the Chinese environmental movement. This clear 
calculation is particularly viable on environmental issues where, should the protesters 
“win,” they will gain a tangible benefit, but a loss will have a high probability of severe 
consequences (unbreathable air, polluted water, etc.). Each successful protest empowers 
the next and individuals gain greater confidence in their ability to confront the 
government and succeed. The government has recently signaled an opportunity for 
mobilization in recent speeches by calling for a “war on pollution,”61 granting activists 
new avenues by which to protest while remaining within the system.62 
Finally, a social movement must include some level of extra-institutional action or 
it is no different from an interest group. Both social movements or interest group may be 
embedded within the system, but an interest group is typically regarded as a legitimate 
actor within the system and refrains from extra-institutional actions. Conversely, a social 
movement’s standing within the given system is more precarious and may require extra-
institutional actions to force issues or draw attention to desired changes.63 Such extra-
institutional actions will be by necessity collective in nature, as single individuals often 
do not have the bargaining power to affect change alone.64 
Angry Chinese citizens are increasingly willing to turn to extra-institutional 
measures in order to be heard, but the majority of Chinese environmentalists prefer 
apolitical, embedded methods. “Embedded activism,” one of the strongest characteristics 
of the Chinese environmental movement, allow activists to challenge the government, 
particularly vis-à-vis upholding its own laws.65 By confronting the government only on 
issues such as the environment, which the government has signaled as an area of 
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opportunity, the embedded activist learns how to push boundaries and becomes more 
proficient at organizing civil society without challenging the government’s political 
legitimacy. While one of the more dominant aspects of the Chinese environmental 
movement is its embeddedness, other characteristics align with the broader social 
movement literature. 
Social movement theorists have four complimentary types of theories to describe 
social movements: rational response, state and market, moral outrage, and community 
justice. Rational response theory assumes riots or protests occur for rational reasons, 
varying directly with either economic hardship or a tangible injustice.66 In the case of 
China, this would be evident if the number and size of protests occurred in direct relation 
to the level of environmental degradation. While protestors often have rational reasons 
for their actions, this theory fails to explain the timing or manner of some protests and the 
lack of protests in a similar case at a different time or location.67 
A second theory focuses on the moral economy or moral outrage of a community 
in response to policy decisions. According to this theory, protests are triggered by a 
perceived injustice and the protestors’ frame themselves as “defending traditional rights 
or customs”68 and have the implicit support of their communities.69 Moral outrage theory 
builds on the foundation of the rational response theory, focusing on a moral tipping 
point rather than economic want. While this theory offers a good addition to rational 
response theory, it still fails to address variations amongst different social class or 
geographic regions.70 Moral outrage might help explain why people protests singular 
issues, such as the planning or building of a new factory, but do not protest the slow 
degradation of the air or water. New additions are a type of tipping point, where the status 
quo may not be acceptable but neither is it worth the risk of an active protest. 
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Whereas the first two theories focus on individuals as the actors of protest, the 
final two theories change the actor, one looking at the community as the primary actor 
and the other the state. Community justice theory focuses on local communities as the 
primary actor of protests. In this type of protest, the dynamics focus on local patronage 
politics with protestors making concerted effects to “preclude challenge to the authority 
of local gentry”71 that may increase the cost of protest or decrease the chance of 
success.72 While necessary, the community justice theory is not sufficient because it fails 
to “explain cycles of protest over time and space,”73 neglects societal or community 
conditions, and neglects to account for the forms of interaction. 
The final theory, state and market theory, focuses on large-scale social or political 
changes. This theory is excellent for explaining why protests do or do not occur at the 
national level, but provides little clarity on the specific timing or location of protests 
within the nation. The structural factors and policy decisions at the national level may 
show how “causal conditions work at the national level and affect local settings to the 
extent that communities reflect broader processes.”74 The theory, however, does not 
explain “the meaning and processes that animate protest action”75 nor does it provide 
linkage framework between the various levels. The four theories described are 
complimentary and depending on the scale or size of movement and illuminate different 
trends and aspects of a movement. 
2. Environmental Activism and NGOs in China 
The growing influence of civil society appears to be tolerated and even 
encouraged where the government is weakest. In 1992, “Chinese officials began to 
incorporate the ideal of sustainable development into their planning process; in some 
cases, this was merely rhetorical, but in others the language represented real policy 
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change.”76 This specifically referred to the reintroduction and legalization of NGOs.77 
The fear of strong opposition remains, however, so the CCP has permitted the number of 
NGOs to grow while simultaneously continuing to limit operations.78 “By 2002 there 
were 230,000 officially registered NGOs…And if one attempts to account for NGOs that 
are not registered with the government, the number by some accounts is as high as two 
million.”79 These organizations, often created to address social concerns, are generally 
welcomed by government officials and “are somewhat reminiscent of organizations that 
appeared during the republican period, when religious groups, literary societies, and relief 
organizations emerged and prospered”80 until war with Japan led to a crackdown on 
autonomous organizations. This cycle was repeated during the early 1980s with opening 
economic reforms until autonomous organizations were again suppressed in the wake of 
Tiananmen. Post-Tiananmen, one of the greatest concerns for the CCP was that existing 
NGOs would serve to provide a safe haven for intellectuals to gather under legal auspice 
and their ideologies and anti-government leanings would ferment and grow, like a 
disease.81 
As with other areas of China’s development, the toleration and understanding of 
NGOs appears to be working along a type of dual system in which individuals or 
organizations can create and register NGOs, but the government will also create 
Government Organized Non-governmental Organizations (GONGOs), which “are simply 
tools by which government agencies may take advantage of the desire of foreign 
governments and international NGOs to support the NGO movement and civil society in 
China.”82 While most GONGOs will remain dependent on the governmental aspects of a 
governmental organized non-governmental organization, some may eventually evolve 
into truly self-sufficient non-governmental organizations. Others develop a symbiotic 
                                                 
76 Economy, The River Runs Black, 99. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid., 134. 
79 Ibid., 132. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 135. 
 16
relationship between NGOs and the related GONGO, or to serve as a bridge between the 
government and NGOs. 
The concept of GONGOs or state-led societal organizations is useful for 
explaining how NGOs gain influence against a semi-authoritarian state. Working through 
GONGOs, individuals do not attack the state directly but lobby from within the system.83 
Working from within the system may be slower than confronting the state directly, or 
appear too mild, but such confrontations against even a semi-authoritarian government 
are dangerous.84 A negotiated interaction between state and society has largely developed 
due to the semi-authoritarian nature of the Chinese state.85 
The literature on civil society and environmental policy is growing and as the 
concern over China’s future and its environment continue to grow, so will the available 
works. Yet, much of the scholarly literature is concerned either solely with civil society, 
the growth of environmentalism, or with how Chinese environmentalists are working 
within the system to gradually influence change. The most recent literature focuses on 
China’s environmental concerns and discusses the government’s response and policies or 
focuses on single provinces or issues and comparative case. This thesis uses many of 
those articles, both scholarly and journalistic, to study the protests and their effect on 
environmentalism, civil society, and the evolution of a Chinese environmental 
movement.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The CCP appears to have conceded environmental issues as an area in which 
people may challenge commercial and governmental actions;86 however, the 
environmental movement may grow from its current limited scope to include broader 
issues at a national level. China’s environmental protests are increasingly attracting 
attention from all levels of the Chinese government as well as from Western media, but 
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the movement does not yet appear to have undergone a significant change of scale. This 
thesis proposes that China’s environmentalism has matured into a social movement 
focused solely on the environment and not on larger democracy concerns. As the 
movement continues to grow in size and legitimacy, the CCP will co-opt or repress these 
street protests, using them to maintain their political monopoly.87 Although the 
government currently concedes some cases to protestors, each movement teaches skills to 
the organizers that could eventually be used in against broader, more politically sensitive, 
issues.  
Because environmental issues are so widespread in China, the more informed the 
public, the greater the likelihood of a protest. Increased dissemination outside official 
government channels may slowly allow China’s civil society to coalesce and reach past 
local barriers. Each successful protest empowers and emboldens the next protest. My 
hypothesis is that China has developed a nascent environmental movement and that a 
more active and vibrant civil society will continue to support the state by working within 
the current political system. China’s civil society will not confront the government 
directly nor morph into a democratic movement within the next ten years. 
D. METHODS AND OUTLINE 
The following chapters take a closer look at recent environmental protests, where 
they occurred, the issues protested, and if they have affected Chinese society and politics. 
Due to an inability to access primary sources on Chinese protests, this thesis uses 
secondary sources and Western news accounts. Unfortunately, this introduces an inherent 
bias to the sample. Because of these limitations, this thesis will only cover some of the 
broad, macro-level trends visible through the lens of these sources.  
To understand the context of environmental activism in China, Chapter II traces 
the history of Chinese civil society and environmental activism from Mao through the 
current government. Chapter II will also briefly introduce a few of the key organizations 
and individuals that are prominent or influential in the Chinese environmental movement. 
Chapter III will provide a broad overview of environmental street protest trends through 
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qualitative analysis of the collected dataset. Chapter IV will use the qualitative data of 
Chapter III as a foundation before offering a high-level analysis of the Chinese 
environmental movement within the larger context of social movement literature. Finally, 
the conclusion will speculate on the effect of environmental protests on Chinese Civil 
Society.  
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II. CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
LEGISLATION: 1980–2014 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is obsessed with stability. The memories of 
the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the trauma of watching Communist regimes fall 
in the early 1990s have left their mark on CCP leaders. These two events coalesced in the 
minds of reformers, 1980-present, to ensure that domestic stability and the primacy of the 
CCP formed the foundation for any reforms.88 Although the Chinese economy has grown 
several orders of magnitude in the last three decades, the size and strength of civil society 
has not grown at the same pace. Instead, civil society’s growth has been sporadic and 
incremental. A particularly distinctive and long lasting sphere of civil society is the 
environmental movement. While, today, the environmental movement is a global 
phenomenon, the strength and characteristics of each country’s environmental movement 
is unique. In China, in comparison to other segments of civil society, the growth and 
resilience of the environmental movement has been particularly noteworthy. This chapter 
outlines the rediscovery of Chinese civil society starting in the 1980s, provides a brief 
overview of existing environmental legislation in China, introduces a few of the more 
influential individuals and organizations within China’s green sphere, and describes the 
interaction between those groups and the government. The following overview is not 
meant to be either comprehensive or all-inclusive, but serve as a means of orientation to 
the limits, challenges, and advances made over the last three and a half decades. 
A. CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
Founded in 1949, the modern Chinese state or the People’s Republic of China was 
modeled after the Stalin-Lenin model. There was little room for individuality and, under 
Mao, independent social organizations were either “outlawed or absorbed into the party-
state system.”89 Civil society was temporarily eradicated and every aspect of daily life 
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became regulated.90 Yet, unlike other Communist countries, Mao went further to push the 
idea of struggle in an attempt to banish the Confucian ideal of “Great Harmony.” Mao’s 
China forced people “to participate actively in government-sponsored campaigns”91 and 
state approved associations. “Work units,” or danwei’s, controlled all aspects of social 
life in urban areas and the rural areas were managed through village farm collectives.92 
The government even attempted to regulate opinions via neighborhood watches and 
residence committees, which reported resident’s opinions to administrative agencies and 
mobilized residents to respond to government calls.93  
While no government can truly control personal opinion or thought, the PRC was 
remarkably able to regulate and censor publically expressed thoughts. Chinese Civil 
Society largely vanished after 1949, but the lowest point of civil society was the peak of 
the Cultural Revolution. During this period of Chinese history, teenagers roamed the 
country purging established social and bureaucratic structures, anarchy descended, and 
society unraveled.94 Without a functioning state or society, civil society disappeared. By 
1977, “both civil society and the legal system”95 had collapsed. Still referenced today, 
this period of anarchy serves as one justification for the continued semi-authoritarian 
control of the modern state.   
According to the revolutionaries who took over China in 1949, one of the 
country’s greatest weaknesses was its lack of industry. Maoist thought posited that China 
could, with great effort and willpower, overcome the development gap and quickly rise as 
an industrial nation.96 Mao either did not understand or cared little about the 
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environmental consequences and faced nature as an enemy to be conquered.97 This lack 
of understanding emerges in several of the mass campaigns. Of particular note, the 
“extermination of the Four Pests” was an exhortation to destroy sparrows, rats, 
mosquitoes, and flies.98 Yet once the sparrows had been killed or driven away, the 
unbalanced ecosystem allowed numerous insects to flourish and destroy crops creating 
disastrous second and third order consequences—in this case contributing to the famine 
of 1959 to 1961.99  
Even without civil organizations free of government control, by the 1970s, the 
lack of progress and signs of environmental degradation were apparent. With the 
reopening of China and exposure to the West’s changing views on environmental policy, 
a gradual awareness of environmental issues and their importance to society began to 
emerge.100 In 1978, “the Chinese constitution was amended to acknowledge concern for 
the environment, with the proviso that the state had to protect the environment and 
natural resources.”101 Although the words were added to the state constitution, they 
neither slowed nor changed the pace of development. 
1. The Years 1980–1989 
Despite this slight nod toward the environment, as Deng Xiaoping consolidated 
his control over the party, economic development remained the primary focus. As the 
early reformers began opening China’s economy to the outside world, political 
advancement largely reflected success in development and coincided with a reliance on 
economic metrics.102 The opening of the economy, although limited at first, also led to a 
revival of civil society. 
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a. Civil Society 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms allowed local leaders greater latitude and 
devolved economic controls to local and provincial governments.103 The opening of 
space within which civil society could grow represented an unintended side effect  
of the Party’s efforts to simultaneously maintain political control and economic 
decentralization. The need for increased labor forces in the coastal provinces drove many 
of these changes and led to a reduction of enforcement over the hukou, or house 
registration system.104 Although officials allowed the relaxation of travel restrictions to 
tap into China’s vast potential for cheap labor, they remained unwilling to abolish the 
hukou system completely. This means that migrant workers in large cities cannot change 
their residence status from rural to urban—and such status is inherited, not based on 
where a child is born.105 This means that children born and raised to migrant labors in the 
city are ineligible for healthcare or the better schools and their wages are often much less 
than urban residents. Without the ability to rely on state infrastructure, many migrants use 
social services provided by NGOs.  
The political infighting of top officials over the path of reforms led to a “seesaw” 
dynamic of loosening and tightening regulations, both economic and social.106 Two of 
the first regulations dealing with the emerging civil society were the Regulations on 
Foundation Management in 1988 and the Regulations on the Registration and 
Management of Social Organizations in 1989. Together, these regulations mandate that 
any non-profit organization obtain a government sponsor before they can register.107 
Although recently revised, neither regulation has been replaced and both remain a major 
obstacle toward official legitimation of many grass-root organizations.108 
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The student protests in 1989, were the largest in a series of several others over the 
preceding decade. It built upon the historical precedent of using the death of a significant 
political figure to advance a limited window of opportunity to air grievances.109 The 
student protests initially arose from outrage over a slowing of economic liberalization and 
increased corruption, but as it gained momentum, demands eventually encompassed calls 
first, for limited democratization, and then eventually all-encompassing changes.110 As 
the protests stretched into May, sympathetic protests occurred in over 150 cities 
throughout the country.111 The June 4 crackdown in Beijing heralded a shift of the 
political winds and served as a reminder, both internally and internationally, that China 
remained a single party, authoritarian system, despite a decade of rapid economic 
liberalization.  
The resulting crackdown in Tiananmen and other student protests nationwide 
pushed the nascent civil society back toward the fringes and “effectively throttled protest 
activities everywhere.”112 The harsh response also served as a clear reminder to remain 
far from political challenges. So long as organizations served a useful role in society, they 
would continue to be ignored, but should they anger government leaders, arbitrary 
detentions, house arrests, or harassment would follow. 
b. Environmental Regulations  
The example of both the Western world and the newly industrialized East Asian 
countries suggested that sacrificing the environment for rapid economic development and 
then cleaning up the environment represented the standard path for success. Chinese 
leaders made a conscious decision to focus first on development and then second on the 
environment throughout the 1980s and 1990s.113 Early environmental legislation 
represented paper tigers, but even its existence was a small step forward.  
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During the 1980s, the government wrote several laws and created organizations to 
monitor environmental degradation or regulate policies, but economic decentralization 
continued to undermine the ability of these organizations.114 China is a country ruled by 
law in which the CCP is supreme and laws are interpreted to suit the whims of the 
Party.115 In the realm of environmental law, application is often applied unevenly and on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Three of the most important changes in the 1980s were the creation of the 
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection in 1982; the 
separation of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) from the previous 
Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction in 1988; and the 1989 Environmental 
Protection Law announced by the National People’s Congress.116 The initial impact of 
merging environmental protection into the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction was 
a temporary weakening of the Environmental Protection Bureaus. This was partially 
reversed two years later when the State Council elevated the importance of environmental 
protection, doubling the staff to 120, and freeing up funding. The separation of the 
Environmental Protection Bureau into its own agency further strengthened its 
bureaucratic standing, but it remained junior to other ministries and unable to effectively 
enforce standards. The Environmental Protection Law was another step forward in 
recognizing the importance of environmental protection embracing “four central 
principles: (1) coordination of environmental protection, (2) pollution prevention, (3) 
polluter responsibility, and (4) enhancement of environmental management.”117 Despite 
the growing understanding of the importance of environmental protection, particularly on 
sustaining economic development, enforcement and implementation remained weak.118 
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2. The Years 1990–1999 
In June 1989, Shanghai Party secretary, Jiang Zemin was chosen as general 
secretary of the Party and therefore, the “first among equals.” He would never succeed in 
dominating the leadership discourse as previous General Secretaries before him.119 
Because he was in Shanghai at the start of the 1989 student demonstrations, party elders 
saw Jiang Zemin as acceptable to the masses as well as a pliable and cautious man able to 
navigate the next stages of reform without sympathizing with political reformers.120 
During his tenure, the succession process for top leaders has “become more regularized, 
even if [it] remains largely nontransparent and potentially destabilizing.” The distinction 
of being the first to successfully navigate the transition process would go to his successor, 
Hu Jintao.121 
During the 1990s, the economic reforms began to take root and China’s GDP 
averaged 9.4 percent annually.122 This rapid growth was due in large part to the rapid 
industrialization of the southern provinces, a massive influx of foreign direct investment, 
and international trade valued at $474 billion in 2000.123 As China’s economy grew, and 
it avoided the worst effects of the East Asian Financial Crisis, so did China’s prestige and 
confidence in dealing with other nations on the internationals stage. Finally, in 1997, 
England returned Hong Kong Chinese rule under a policy of “one country, two 
systems.”124  
a. Civil Society 
Following the crackdown in 1989, China faced international censorship from the 
outside world; however, the lure of a new and lucrative market ensured that despite the 
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political fallout, economic growth and experimentation would continue. Although the 
CCP has made occasional attempts to recentralize some authority, the continued need for 
decentralization, privatization and openness in economic reforms in order to continue 
economic reforms have thwarted most of these centralizing efforts.125 In the space opened 
by the struggle between a decentralized market economy and centralized political control, 
civil society grew. By the early 1990s, social organizations had been reformed and—
despite new regulations published in 1989—could be broken into two categories: those 
that were sponsored and legal and those that operated with a legal gray zone. This gray 
zone includes NGOs who register as businesses to avoid the need for a sponsor and those 
who do not register, but continue to operate. Unregistered NGOs are tolerated because 
they provide important social welfare services or non-political associations, such as 
calligraphy, literary, or photographic societies, or arts clubs.126  
The legal ambiguity of the early 1990s set a precedent for civil society in China. 
Many organizations stepped in to fill the void left by a receding state and an expanding 
private sector focused on the bottom line, not quality of life.127 Those groups deemed 
apolitical and which offered aid and other social services, operated within a complex 
framework of personal networks and shifting laws.128 Any organization deemed a 
challenge or threat to the legitimacy or power of officials was prosecuted.  
The first officially registered, enduring, environmental NGO (ENGO), the Friends 
of Nature, or the “Green Culture Institute of the International Academy of Chinese 
Culture,” registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1994 to raise environmental 
awareness among average Chinese citizens.129 Friends of Nature was founded by the son 
of a revolutionary hero and has since managed to navigate the legal framework, 
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remaining a legitimate ENGO. Following the brief initial window of openness, the state 
issued a two-year moratorium on the registration of new NGOs.130  
The year 1998 was a year of mixed results. Another small step forward occurred 
when the new Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Management of Popular 
Non-Enterprise Units (PNEUs) was passed, which allowed several independent non-
profits to register in 2000 as PNEUs without sponsors.131 Registration and sponsorship 
are important tools of surveillance and control through which the sponsor is expected to 
help ensure the sponsored organizations do not become a threat to the Party or overstep 
their bounds.132 While relaxing some domestic controls through PNEUs, the government 
placed new restrictions on the official sanctioning of NGOs. The Regulation for 
Registration and Management of Social Organizations reiterated the need for a 
government sponsor before being recognized and demanded that NGOs prove legitimate 
funding sources. The law set initial funding minimums: 100,000 Yuan for a national 
organization or 30,000 Yuan for a local organization. The regulation also stated that all 
NGOs must reregister and barred anyone previously convicted of troublemaking or 
political crimes from participation.133  
Another small step toward an independent civil society, enacted in 1999, was the 
Public Welfare Donation Law. The law further clarified “how parties who received a 
donation might be expected to perform.”134 It also served as early legal framework for a 
system of contractual relationships and defined public welfare to include, among others: 
public health services, environmental protection, public utility construction, and services 
to promote social development. Yet, despite these small steps, the majority of NGOs 
continued to operate in an ambiguous status without legal protection or the official 
authority to open bank accounts or receive funding.135 
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b. Environmental Regulations  
As the openness of civil society fluctuated by degree, a handful of ENGOs were 
able to find sympathetic officials willing to serve as sponsors, but many environmental 
groups chose not to register.136 Within the national bureaucracy, the senior member of 
the state environmental apparatus was NEPA. In 1998, NEPA was raised to the 
ministerial level and renamed the State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA).137 This placed SEPA on level with, but not yet senior to, the most powerful 
state-owned enterprises. During the decade, there was a growing interest in the 
environment among average citizens, and several local efforts at slowing the rate of 
degradation, but few such efforts seem to have had significant or long-lasting affects.138 
3. The Years 2000–2014 
The handover of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao marked the “first timely 
and peaceful party leadership succession” when Hu Jintao became General Secretary in 
November 2002 and President of China in March 2003.139 Known within the party “as a 
capable, hard-working, consensus builder,” Hu Jintao’s focus was on continuing China’s 
rise as a regional power and maintaining domestic stability. At home, he quickly moved 
to focus on raising the quality of life among peasants and migrant workers, recreating a 
social safety net, and improving the capacity of the party and government.140 He focused 
on the harmonization of society, while also presiding over a rising tide of nationalism as a 
possible ideological replacement to Communism. By the mid-2000s, after its acceptance 
the World Trade Organization in December 2001, China became more confident in its 
role as an economic power and was increasingly willing and able to manipulate the rules 
of international economics.141 On the international stage, Hu Jintao hosted China’s 
                                                 
136 Lieberthal, Governing China, 200. 
137 Economy, The River Runs Black, 111. 
138 Joy Yueyue Zhang and Michael Barr, Green Politics in China: Environmental Governance and 
State-Society Relations (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 66–67. 
139 Lieberthal, Governing China, 149. 
140 Ibid., 155–56. 
141 “All Change,” Economist, December 10, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21541448. 
 29
“coming out party,” the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. By 2012, China was a 
recognized regional power, and beginning to challenge Western nations as an economic 
rival. 
Then in 2012, China completed its second peaceful transition of senior leadership 
from Hu Jintao and his cabinet to Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping first appeared as heir apparent in 
2009, before official taking over as President of China following the 18th Party Congress 
at the end of 2012.142 As a princeling, or the son of a revolutionary hero and economic 
reformer, President Xi Jinping is considered the fifth generation of leaders, familiar with 
both consensus-style rule and the personality cult of Mao. He is also surrounded by 
leaders with similar backgrounds, which includes the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. 
He has followed through on promises of limited reforms without risking the strength of 
single party rule. He is the first leader to assume command of both the military and 
control of the party simultaneously. His first two years as president have been filled with 
stories of anti-corruption campaigns, increased tensions at sea, increased pressure on civil 
society and little reform either economically or politically.143 
a. Civil Society 
Following two decades of economic growth and lax environmental regulation 
enforcement, the dark side of capitalism became more apparent in China. As a new 
generation of urban Chinese came of age without personal memories of hardship or chaos 
and income inequalities between the rich and poor, urban and rural, and other problems 
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associated with the developing world began to emerge, the CCP is struggling with a lack 
of coherent ideology. Under President Hu Jintao, economic growth remained the primary 
focus but a secondary focus on “harmony” also increased space for civil society to grow. 
In 2004, Premier Wen Jiaobao stated that the government would soon pass the 
responsibility for specific social services to NGOs and other intermediary agencies, 
offering further hope of continued liberalization. A few years later, the Deputy Director 
of SEPA, cited the importance of NGOs, particularly ENGOs for the enforcement and 
education of environmental protection.144 Then in 2008, a “new Regulations on Open 
Government Information” took effect giving “citizens the legal right to obtain 
government information.” Combined with the Measures on Open Environmental 
Information, Chinese environmentalists hailed the new regulations “as ‘an important 
milestone for freedom of information in China,’ and a powerful lever for the public to 
monitor companies’ environmental performance.’”145 The reality, however, has proved 
more disappointing in implementation. 
The cautious seesawing continued as the decade came to a close, and in early 
2010, new regulations “placed additional obstacles to receiving international funding, 
with new requirements for notarized agreements and detailed application forms.”146 
Revenue streams for NGOs in China come from bother international and domestic 
donors, however, the majority of human rights or other controversial activists’ funding is 
primarily from overseas. Regulating who and how organizations can receive funding 
allows the government another lever of control. The new regulations, “represent a large 
burden for independent NGOs and leave them vulnerable to interference by government 
agencies through the uncertainties they create.”147 Yet, even as these new regulations 
came into force, the leaders drafting the Twelfth Five-Year Plan wrote a document 
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allowing civil society to play a “substantial role in China’s social and economic 
development,”148 echoing aspects of civil society under the Qing.  
b. Environmental Regulations 
During the 2000s, not only was the growth in civil society allowed, but also the 
growing middle class began to take more of an interest in societal problems. Of particular 
interest to this new generation was the obvious degradation of the environment and its 
impact on their health and that of their children. Taking advantage of greater operating 
space, Chinese NGOs worked to educate people and increase their awareness of the 
hazards of environmental degradation.  
Despite numerous laws and regulation, enforcement has proven extremely 
difficult. In 2005, surveys revealed that only 23 percent of factories properly treat sewage 
and that “one-third of industrial wastewater in China and two-thirds of household sewage 
are released untreated.”149 With little incentive and no enforcement, China’s 
environmental regulations are little more than paper tigers. For example, in 2001, Beijing 
outlined plans to cut sulfur dioxide emissions by 10 percent over a three-year time span. 
Instead, between 2002 and 2005, “emission rose by 27 percent.”150The one exception to 
this lack of enforcement surrounded the 2008 Olympic host sites, but the air quality of 
Olympic sites returning to previous levels of pollution once international attention was no 
longer focused on Beijing. So far, government rhetoric has yet to have any significant or 
long-term impact on conditions on the ground.  
China’s interaction on the world stage has been similar. Since ratifying the Kyoto 
Protocols in 2002, China has signed “38 out of 48 international conventions relating to 
environmental protection.”151 Despite increasingly strong rhetoric in international 
forums, governmental actions remain incremental and insignificant allowing the 
environment in China to continue deteriorating at an unsustainable pace. One step, which 
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appeared aimed at increasing government focus on environmental protection occurred in 
2008 when SEPA was further elevated to the cabinet level and renamed the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP). While the elevation allowed the MEP to vote within 
the State Council, and placed it senior to the state-owned enterprises, the MEP is still 
unable to force other ministries to follow its advice and lacks jurisdiction over local 
Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs). The promotion also contained a reduction in 
staff: only 300 employees in Beijing and a total of national size equivalent to about one-
sixth of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The MEP also has much less 
funding than its U.S. counterpart, a promised 1.3 percent of GDP. Of the promised 
funding, approximately half went to legitimate projects and of those projects considered 
legitimate, approximately 60 percent was spent on less critical developments such as 
green spaces instead of sewage or wastewater treatment facilities.152 
The previous year, in 2007, the judiciary created another avenue toward 
environmental reform—environmental protection courts. Dedicated to ruling on 
environmental infractions these courts were given authority to rule in criminal, civil, and 
administrative cases. While another excellent step forward on paper, the majority of cases 
accepted to be tried have been small, local issues aimed at paying damages to locals 
without addressing more complicated issues or challenging any companies of significant 
size or importance.153  
A final tool available to the MEP targets companies’ wallets. The first part, 
“green credit,” allows lower borrowing rates for companies that are more 
environmentally friendly. Unfortunately, enforcement capability is limited and many 
provincial authorities are unwilling to reduce or cut credit to profitable but polluting 
companies within their area. The second half, implemented in January 2008 and named 
the Green Securities policy, prevents heavily polluting companies from being granted an 
initial public offering (IPO). This appears to have had a stronger initial impact. In the 
year following implementation, 20 of the 38 companies requesting an IPO failed the 
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environmental assessment and were prevented from listing an IPO.154 Taken together, all 
of the government’s new regulations and initiatives offer new opportunities and signal the 
government’s willingness to engage the public on environmental issues. The 
government’s signals of increased openness to engagement, combined with the slow 
movement of the lower levels of bureaucracy help explain the rise in environmental 
activism. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND CASE 
STUDIES 
China’s environmental awareness has grown since the early 1990s with small 
grassroots organizations. An interesting aspect of NGOs in China is that unlike in the 
Western understanding of NGOs, self-government is not considered an integral part of 
the official definition in China.155 Instead, the Chinese government believes NGO’s 
should be sponsored by a “mother-in-law.”156 Both the need for a sponsor and a disregard 
for self-government has resulted in the parallel development of government organized 
NGOs (GONGOs). Some GONGOs serve as holding patterns for older bureaucrats not 
yet ready to retire, some serve as a government mechanism for working with international 
organizations, and some serve as legitimate, semi-independent organizations bridging 
smaller NGOs and government sponsors.157 Alongside both the official and unofficial 
ENGOs, China’s MEP has six registered GONGOs: the China Environment Science 
Association; the China Environment Protection Industry Association; the China 
Environment Fund; All-China Environment Federation; and the Chinese Society for 
Environment Sciences. 
1. Environmental Activists 
By 2006, the Chinese government listed 354,000 officially registered NGOs of 
which there were 3,539 ENGOs, GONGOs, and school environment societies recorded in 
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Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan in 2008 by the All-China Environment 
Federation.158 Of the thousands of ENGOs throughout China, most are small, local 
grassroots organizations; however among the thousands of lesser-known ENGOs are four 
with a much larger area of influential and broader recognition outside of China. The 
ENGOs highlighted in this chapter are: Friends of Nature, Green Village, Green Beagle, 
and the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs.  
a. Environmental Non-government Organizations 
One of the oldest ENGOs in China is Friends of Nature (FON). Started by Liang 
Congjie in 1994, under the sponsorship of the Chinese Academy of Culture, of which he 
was a member. As a Party insider and rising environmental voice, with significant 
government ties, Liang has been able push the boundaries of government efforts from 
within the system. This has included sponsoring proposals from other individuals and 
publicly criticizing local officials when other government agencies were unable, as well 
as providing small start-up grants to other rising ENGOs.159 
Friends of Nature’s primary focus areas are environmental education and the 
conservation of local wildlife. While FON’s offices are in Beijing and it illegal to have 
branches in other localities, FON often sends volunteers into other provinces and rural 
villages to spread awareness of the environment with emphasis on local issues. They have 
also found ways to circumvent regulations by establishing member organizations—27 to 
date—outside Beijing.160 Members of FON have also left Beijing and gone on to start 
new NGOs in other cities, spreading FON’s influence into new cities. Of specific note are 
the Green River Network in Chengdu and Green Volunteer League in Chongqing.161  
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A second Beijing based ENGO is Global Village Beijing. Founded by Liao 
Xiaoyi (aka Sheri Liao) in 1996, Global Village chose to register as a business due to the 
government moratorium on new NGO registration between 1995 and 1997. The focus of 
Global Village is on urban environmental issues and raising public awareness through 
television programing. Focusing on urban issues within Beijing, Global Village works 
with local officials to promote recycling projects and the use of energy efficient 
technology. Unlike some environmentalists, Liao Xiaoyi maintains a firm apolitical 
stance and avoids “troublemaking.” She believes an NGO should educate the public, help 
the government with implementation, and encourage businesses to accept corporate 
social responsibilities.162 
A third ENGO, Green Beagle, similarly focuses primarily on awareness and 
education, but also conducts citizen journalist workshops. Feng Yongfeng, a journalist for 
a paper catering to the academic elite and minority parties, founded Green Beagle. 
Despite the primary emphasis on education and awareness, Green Beagle also sees itself 
as a constructive, professional, non-confrontational environmental workshop. To this 
aim, they began running “free public services…to test electromagnetic pollution, indoor 
formaldehyde pollution, noise pollution and water quality”163 and then posting surveys 
and information online. This background placed them in good standing in the forefront of 
the citizen campaign against China’s poor air quality (discussed in further depth 
below).164 
A final ENGO, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), was 
founded in 2005 by Ma Jun. He also works as a journalist and published the book 
China’s Water Crisis, in 1999, to highlight the issue of China’s water pollution. IPE 
collects data on environmental polluters and publishes online datasets focused on 
highlighting awareness for local populations and shaming companies into compliance. In 
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2006, the datasets contained over 3,000 violations and within two years had grown to 
over 90,000 data points. To avoid confrontation with government censors, IPE publishes 
only government-approved data, partners with the MEP, and is more explicit when 
calling out violations supported by multi-national companies (MNC) than state-owned 
and domestic enterprises.165 
In 2008, IPE pushed the boundaries of civil society regulation within China by 
forming an alliance of 41 environmental groups aimed at conducting surveys and 
providing environmental data on MNC’s supply chain management. The campaign 
pointed to 29 MNCs whose sub-contracted factories were heavily polluting the Chinese 
environment, including heavy metal poisoning of small children. Twenty-eight of the 
twenty-nine companies were quick to accept the criticism and suggestions of the IPE 
alliance. Many of these companies also launched their own environmental surveys or 
offered other guarantees. The final company spent months stalling before grudgingly 
listening, but offering no reassurance or guarantees. It was not until two U.S.-based 
organizations became involved, a media campaign to American consumers was launched, 
and sustained pressure showing numerous deaths or injuries linked to supply factories 
that the company eventually initiated its own environmental audits, publicized the names 
of their suppliers, and finally agreed to work with Chinese ENGOs.  
The importance of this campaign is two-fold. First, as shown through IPE’s ability 
to publicly highlight environmental issues, the government granted tacit approval. This 
sets a precedent for journalists to attack other polluting factories. Second, IPE was able to 
lead a coalition of geographically disparate organizations covering most of China, 
including two U.S. based organizations and maintain pressure over two years in their 
campaign for a cleaner environment. While branches of the same NGO within multiple 
cities is banned, this shows that a growing connectivity of Chinese civil society is being 
allowed, at least when focusing on the environment and targeting international 
companies.166 
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b. Online Activists 
As the political opportunity space for civil society grew, new technologies were 
also emerging and making their way to Chinese consumers. The first wave was cell 
phones and the ability to text or communicate with others without being physically co-
located. This allowed for the faster communication of ideas across large geographic 
areas.167 Then came advent of the Internet in the late 1990s and the rise of social media 
as a new tool and medium through which people could communicate on a large scale in 
the mid-2000s. As the Internet developed, the rise of social media opened more space for 
Chinese, both overseas and domestic, to communicate and raise awareness of 
environmental degradation. 
As ENGOs grow in size and numbers, the support and information available 
online has played a factor in reaching a growing number of Chinese and the growing 
environmental movement within China. While IPE built consensus and alliances, one of 
their greatest tools was the ability to offer database of heavily polluters online. Ma Jun’s 
work is one aspect of online activism, several other influential websites include 
Chinadialogue and China Digital Times (CDT). Chinadialogue is a London and Beijing 
based non-profit devoted “to the publication of high quality, bilingual information, direct 
dialogue and the search for solutions to our shared environmental challenges”168 through 
citizen journalists—articles and photos—and discussion within China and around the 
world.169 China Digital Times, based in Berkley, California, does not focus solely on the 
environment, but serves as a bilingual media aggregator tracking, reporting, and 
translating the news from China into English and from the West into Mandarin. They also 
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publish leaked documents from the propaganda department on the mechanisms behind 
China’s censors.170 
2. A Case Study 
The following section will examine a single case study of how civil society has 
pressured the government for limited changes without protest. Chapter III will further 
discuss the numerous protests that have occurred over the last decade and Chapter IV will 
briefly review the varied responses from the government. While some protests have 
succeeded in scaling back or closing a single factory, in many cases, the closure is 
temporary at worst, or the offending factory is moved to a less contentious area at best. 
Even the best cases have had limited impact on policy.  
One reason for limited impact may be the narrow operating space for public 
discourse. While the Chinese government has numerous environmental regulations and 
policies are occasionally enforced, the capacity of the state to increase enforcement 
appears limited. Instead, ENGOs focus on filling this gap. Sometimes this means 
teaching about the environment and conservation. Other times it means extended, non-
confrontational campaigns or lawsuits, and sometimes it is protest.171 The remainder of 
this section explains one example, which demonstrates the success of non-confrontational 
campaigns in China. Protests will be covered more extensively in Chapters III and IV.  
One of the most widely recognized Chinese environmental concerns, worldwide, 
is air pollution. Following the 2008 Olympics, particular focus has been on Beijing’s air. 
Air pollution has gotten so bad that, in September of 2012, a businessman began to sell 
“fresh air in a can.”172 Prior to the 2008 Olympics, residents of Beijing and other Chinese 
cities were aware that the air quality was poor, but not necessarily the degree of harm or 
level of degradation. The vague notion of harm was also seen as less important than 
continued economic growth. At the time, official Chinese statistics used particulate 
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matter 10, or PM10, a less strict standard of microns 2.5 to 10 microns in diameter.173 
Using this standard for official statistics, 70 percent of Chinese cities met international 
standards. The Chinese government then used these statistics to argue that the complaints 
of the international community were exaggerated and an attempt to lessen the pride of 
Beijing hosting the 2008 Olympics. Then starting in the spring of 2008, the U.S. Embassy 
began tweeting a new air quality measure, PM2.5.174 PM2.5 is the level of particulate 
matter in the air 2.5 microns or less, too small to see, but larger enough to irritate lungs 
and cause respiratory health issues.175 
Leading up the Olympics, the CCP promised the international community it 
would clean up the air in cities where sporting events were to occur. The effort required 
to ensure blue skies for these events was massive and some of these temporary measures 
were repeated for the APEC meetings in Beijing, the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, and 
other high visibility events hosted by China. The temporary respites gave people a brief 
look at a brighter alternative.176 As the U.S. embassy continued to tweet PM2.5 numbers, 
local residents soon began re-tweeting via Sina Weibo, China’s indigenous social media 
platform (analogous to a combination of Facebook and Twitter). The data was then 
compared—often unfavorably— to the apparently massaged official data released by 
various governmental organizations and Party propaganda officials. In 2010, the MEP 
released new air quality standards, but left out the politically controversial PM2.5 
numbers, enraging the simmering population.177 Although angry and growing 
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increasingly concerned, without a focal point for their anger and no opportunity space, 
the anger could only to simmer. 
Then in 2011, Green Beagle started a grassroots campaign to monitor local air 
quality. Using 24 volunteers, over the course of a month they mapped a rough sketch of 
Beijing’s air quality citywide and the idea spread like wildfire throughout the country. 
Volunteers began to travel with small air-quality monitors and posted the information on 
Weibo using hashtags such as “I monitor the air for my country” or “I monitor the air for 
my [city].”178 That year, two Beijingers also published a photo journal showing that 
between 2009 and 2010 there had been only 180 days of blue skies despite an official 
count of 280.179 
The government resisted society pressure for another year, and in 2012 Deputy 
Minister of Environmental Protection even attempted to criticize the U.S. embassy’s 
publication of PM2.5 data. The Deputy Minister argued that the Twitter stream violated 
Chinese law, ignored international convention, and interfered in China’s domestic 
affairs.180 An embassy spokesman replied that the monitoring was aimed at and for 
informing U.S. citizens and was therefore was wholly separate from Chinese internal 
affairs.181 The Chinese media responded to the environmental minister’s statements with 
derision and sided in favor of continued open information. Finally, in early 2012, the 
CCP began releasing trial PM2.5 data, revised the air quality standards to include PM2.5, 
data, and promised to roll out stricter standards starting in Beijing and applying 
nationwide by 2015.182 
The case study also demonstrates the role of NGOs in ideal situations: drawing on 
the role of technology, working from the margins inward, and overcoming government 
resistance without violence. From the case study, it becomes clear that street protests are 
only a small part of the spectrum of negotiation between state and society. In a political 
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environment such as China, street protests are extremely risky and the case study 
demonstrates how there are other ways to pressure the government. There is a vibrant 
culture of active individuals willing to confront the government in medium-risk or low-
risk ways to try to secure change.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Since China began its efforts to open its economy, it has focused on development 
first and cleaning the environment second. Over this same period, the government 
recognized it was not capable of filling all its social responsibilities and began to retreat 
from individual’s private lives. This retreat left behind a vacuum into which private 
organizations, both for profit and non-profit, soon moved. Alongside the private sector, 
civil society has grown to assist in the filling of the void, but it has not done so at a pace 
equal to governmental retreat or economic growth. Although the government has come to 
acknowledge the need for limited civil society, it remains leery of many non-profits and 
the possibility, especially during street protests, for them to shift their focus from a 
limited societal issue to a broader goal of democratization. This has led to a shifting array 
of legislation and periods of greater enforcement followed by greater openness. 
While civil society has grown in incremental steps, the level of attention for 
environmental awareness has grown exponentially over the last decade and a half. Since 
the 1980s, China has slowly been bringing its environmental regulations in line with the 
international community. Since the 2002 Kyoto conference, the pace has increased, but 
while the environmental regulations are strong and there are structures for enforcement, 
capacity has not kept pace. China’s enforcement capacity of environmental laws is 
extremely weak, and while gains were made early this decade, in the creation of green 
courts, these courts are not empowered enough in practice to make a lasting effect at this 
time. Without greater funding, more people, and increased enforcement, China’s 
environmental regulations will not be enough to prevent the continued degradation of the 
environment—to China’s peril.  
Chapter II laid out the recent history of modern China’s civil society and 
environmental regulations. It also introduces a few of the ENGOs at the forefront of the 
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environmental movement. These organizations do not appear willing to participate in 
street protests, but are willing to communicate with the media about the issues and often 
provide the means for protesters to meet and communicate. While these ENGOs are 
unwilling to protest in the streets, there appears to be an increasing willingness among 
average citizens to express their displeasure through contentious actions such as street 
protests. Chapter III will look at the available data and a broad overview of first order 
qualitative analysis. 
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST IN CHINA: 
BY THE NUMBERS 
In 2004, there were 74,000 protests in China, up from 10,000 a decade earlier.183 
Often referred to as “mass incidents” by the CCP, the numbers have continued to rise 
with as many as 180,000 reported in 2010.184 Protests in China are not a new 
phenomenon, but historically they have dealt with traditional economic and political 
issues such as land confiscation, taxes and fees, labor, pensions, and corruption. In the 
last decade, however, officials have seen the addition of environmental issues and 
pollution, with one (apparently national level) official recently claiming that “pollution 
has replaced land disputes as the main cause of social unrest in China.”185 As the total 
number of protests increases and the continued growth of the Internet connects more 
people, the number of protests visible to the international community is also rising. 
This chapter looks at the available data and a broad overview of first order 
qualitative analysis. Chapter IV will then discuss these trends in relation to social 
movement theory and international protests. The first section discusses the patterns and 
trends, specifically which topics are most contested and the size of protests. The next 
section compares the data against variables offered in literature on social movements and 
modernization theory. These variables include political opportunity, as measured by 
distance from Beijing; levels of expected dissatisfaction, as measured by severe 
environmental degradation; internal migration patterns; and economic variables such as 
income, industrialization, and unemployment. 
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A. OVERARCHING TRENDS IN CHINESE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTESTS 
Between 2005 and 2014, forty-seven reports of protests focused on environmental 
concerns in several blogs and Western media (only English language sources). The data 
used for this thesis came from a variety of English language newspapers and bilingual 
blogs. Primary search terms used to find articles included “environment,” “protest(s),” 
“China,” and related words.  
Using solely English language sources limits the data to what can be observed or 
is deemed worth reporting in the international media. Prior to 2005, the data seemed to be 
even more limited and biased—only a single, environmental protest in 2004.186 Based on 
the available data from 2005–2014, the lack of incidents of environmental protests pre-
2005 seems to suggest either a lack of reporting, or that the environment has only 
recently become a contentious issue capable of drawing large numbers of people into the 
streets. For clarity, month-year, rather than specific dates were used since too few articles 
listed definite or consistent dates for the length of the street protests. Many times, a 
protest would be reported only once (or one day) or the article would discuss the results 
of previous street protest without specifying dates. When specific dates were not listed, 
the article was assumed to have been published within the same month as the street 
protest. 
Similar to attempting to parse specific dates or exact length of a protest from 
oblique sources, the location of a protest was often difficult to pinpoint, particularly in 
some of the older articles. To standardize the analysis, city or village location was “best 
approximation” and protests were aggregated to the provincial level. The size of protests 
was also aggregated as many articles rounded to “hundreds” or “thousands” rather than 
attempt a more exact estimation. To allow for analysis, even when better numbers were 
listed, the size was rounded to nearest tens place: thousands = 1,000, hundreds = 100 to 
represent best estimates. 
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The category of an issue was determined based on the declared complaint 
reported in the article. If the protest was against a factory or chemical plant but did not 
mention a specific complaint, the protest was categorized based on the type of pollution 
most commonly associated with the specific industry. Because environmental research is 
often broken into air, water, or soil, “overarching concerns” was also divided into the 
categories air, water, or soil. In the event that more than one type of pollution was 
mentioned, the street protest was counted under both categories. The results of some 
protests were included in the data set (Appendix), but will only be cursorily discussed 
and generalized in Chapter IV. The return for attempting to numerically codify results in 
a quantitative matter for Chapter III was determined to be too high, but of interest 
qualitatively. The first section of this chapter will discuss the characteristics of the 
protests such as issue, size, and year. The second section will compare the protests with 
economic and demographic data. 
1. Data Characteristics 
Between 2005 and 2014, there were forty-seven environmental street protests 
reported in China. The four overarching concerns (see Figure 1) can be divided into air 
pollution, soil pollution, water pollution, and fears of electro-magnetic (EM) radiation. 
Figure 1.  Major Over-arching Categories of Environmental Protests 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
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Three of the four categories shown in Figure 1 can be further broken down into a 
handful of larger Subcategories as shown in Figure 2 (Air), Figure 3 (Soil), and Figure 4 
(Water). 
Figure 2.  Air Pollution Protests Divided into Major Subcategories 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
Air pollution, appears to be both the most divisive and most reported. Based on 
Figure 1, the primary reason for protesting was air pollution, which accounted for 26 of the 
47 protests or 55 percent. The protests against air pollution can be further divided into 
several Subcategories (Figure 2), many dealing with the building or launch of a factory or 
power plant. The most frequently reported cause of protest is against the construction and 
operation of paraxylene (PX) plants. The biggest concern with PX is that it is commonly 
perceived as carcinogenic by the public and describe as not terrible toxic by Chinese 
officials. In contrast, U.S. officials state that data is inconclusive as to whether or not the 
chemical is a carcinogenic, but describe it as likely to cause difficulty breathing after short-
term exposure and likely to “cause harmful effects to the liver, kidneys and the central 
nervous system” over the long-term.187 The debate over health effects is not the only issue, 
and all officials agree that PX is highly inflammatory, as demonstrated by the series of 
explosions that occurred in 1997, 2013, and 2015, further compounding fears of PX. While 
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there does not seem to have been a spike in PX protests following the 2013 explosion, the 
building of new PX factories and a mistrust of government regulations remain contentious 
issues.188  
The second most cited cause of protest is the issue of waste incinerators (Figure 
2). Waste incinerators are one way of generating power through the burning of trash. 
Despite their safe, non-toxic, and noncontroversial uses in some developed countries, 
particularly Japan, they are quickly becoming a major flash point in China.189 The 
perceived problem with waste incinerators in China is not the burning of trash, but the 
lack of environmental controls and government transparency that allow plants to spew 
toxins without the more expensive safeguards required in other countries. While the 
government continues to uphold international examples of safe waste incineration use 
and construction, local Chinese remain skeptical.190 
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Figure 3.  Soil Pollution Protests Divided into Major Subcategories 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005-2014),” see Appendix. 
While smog is an obvious and daily reminder of environmental degradation and 
rivers are visibly collecting trash and turning purple, black, or growing poisonous algae 
blooms, soil pollution is the most insidious. The low visibility of soil pollution explains 
why soil-related pollution is protested less often or vigorously than air pollution—people 
generally protest less frequently against gradual or invisible contamination—but not why 
it is more protested than water pollution.  
In China, soil contamination is primarily industrial wastewater or factory runoff 
containing heavy metals that then seeps into the soil. Related protests can be broken into 
a few subcategories (Figure 3), but almost all soil pollution is the result of dangerous 
levels of heavy metals seeping into the soil, particularly in rural areas. The most common 
type of heavy metal poisoning is cadmium, which has affected a significant portion of 
China’s arable land.191 While figures for heavy metal contamination are disturbing, 
affecting approximately 19 percent of China’s farmland, Figure 3 focuses attention on 
lead poisoning specifically, as there have been several cases of children testing well 
above international norms for high concentrations of lead in their blood.192 In one village, 
                                                 
191 He Guangwei, “China’s Dirty Secret: The Boom Poisoned Its Soil and Crops,” eJournal, Yale 
Environment 360, (June 30, 2014), 
http://e360.yale.edu/feature/chinas_dirty_pollution_secret_the_boom_poisoned_its_soil_and_crops/2782/. 
192 Bao Xiaodong and Yang Guoyao, “Locals Attack Factory in South-East China after Child Lead 
Poisonings,” Chinadialogue, February 10, 2014, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/7363-Locals-attack-factory-in-south-east-China-
after-child-lead-poisonings; “Protest against Suspected Lead Pollution Continues in E China English,” 
Xinhua, September 18, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/18/content_12076135.htm. 
 49
615 of 731 children tested positive for lead poisoning but the plant, which stopped 
production in 2009, planned to re-open in 2010 supposedly under stricter regulation.193 
The vulnerability of children, may explain why soil pollution, often the most insidious 
and least visible is protested more often than water pollution. 
Figure 4.  Water Pollution Protests Divided into Major Subcategories 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
Finally, of the three polluted elements, water was the least protested. Water 
pollution does not appear to draw nearly the same level of outrage as either air or soil 
pollution. Two reasons might explain why there are fewer protests: the first is that when 
water pollution reaches the level that it is dangerous to life or livestock, the peasants 
affected seek compensation for lost property and not necessarily agitate for the cessation 
of pollution. These peasants would most likely agree that clean water would be better for 
them, but their immediate concern and primary focus was compensation so they can take 
care of their families and thus does not result in street protests. Second, locating the 
source of pollution is often much more difficult in the case of water pollution, as runoff 
can travel miles downstream, often crossing local or provincial borders.194 To further 
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complicate matters, even within a single province or region, water pollution may fall 
under several ministers depending on the source of the pollution. Such diffuse 
responsibility for pollution lowers the probability that protests will succeed while also 
increasing the risk of contentious action. The newly instituted “green courts” were 
specifically empowered to try to address some of these issues, but to-date have refused to 
confront major polluters.195  
The final category, fear of EM radiation, accounted for only 3 of 47, or 6 percent, 
of the total identified protests and two of the three reported protests took place in the 
same city, Shanghai.196 The third was in the neighboring province of Zhejiang.197 In all 
three protests, the primary fear was radiation, but these fears stemmed largely from a lack 
of understanding of EM radiation, a lack of transparency by the government and the fact 
that recommended safety distances were ignored. For example, one of the Shanghai 
protests centered on building an extension of the magnetic levitation (maglev) train in 
Shanghai. Built by a German engineering company, guidelines for the current maglev 
line recommend the train run a minimum of 300 meters away from the nearest residence. 
Yet the proposed track runs no further than 100 meters from some houses,198 and while it 
is unclear exactly how dangerous EM radiation from maglev trains is, many do not trust 
government statistics.199 Combined with lack of government transparency and input, the 
concerns sparked protests.200 
The survey of past protests covered ten years, but also interesting by comparison 
is the media coverage so far in 2015. Figure 5 shows how the total number of protests 
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reported has increased along with a three-year average trend line. The accompanying 
table shows the number of total protests by year. 
2. Data Trends  
Figure 5.  Protests Over Time (2005–2014, 2015) 
  
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
The number of protests seems to have gone up in aggregate over the years, yet 
there is no correlation year-to-year. While the numbers of mass incidents are growing 
annually, the disparity between total growth and the annual numbers suggest two possible 
explanations. One explanation for this disparity might be that the number environmental 
protests fluctuate rapidly depending on the year. A second, and more probable 
explanation is that the number of protests reported outside of local media or leaked 
beyond the city or province of origin varies depending on outside variables. Such 
variables may include but are not limited to presence of independent or citizen 
journalists, level of government censorship, or penetration of Internet or social media in 
the area. Encouragingly, the number of protests reported so far for 2015 (January-June) 








































tone of media coverage, may indicate willingness of the government to tolerate increased 
pressure on environmental issues or conversely, it may show an inability of the 
government to adequately respond to environment related demands.  
Figure 6 breaks down the protests showing the relevant size of protests in 
comparison to the year in which the protest was held.  
Figure 6.  Size of Protests by Year 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
The size of any given protest appears to vary widely without any discernable 
pattern over time, location, or issue. Most protests appear to be local issues, sparked by 
“not in my backyard” (NIMBY) fears. There is occasional reference of successful or 
semi-successful protests within a given region encouraging other protests201 and at least 
                                                 


















one protest cited a secondary cause as “lending support”202 to protesters arrested in a 
separate city. While protests come in waves and cycles, there is only a little evidence that 
the protests in China have built on each other or are connected, despite the growth of 
social media as a tool theoretically capable of connecting protestors. 
B. PROTESTS IN COMPARISON TO DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC 
DATA 
In many protests, an individual’s reasons for joining a protest may differ from the 
reason stated by a protest’s leaders and one issue may spark a protest, but as it grows, it 
might absorb multiple issues, create new issues, or become increasingly radical in its 
demands.203 This section will look at the protests in comparison to outside variables such 
as political opportunity and location, level of environmental degradation, internal 
migration, and economic factors including the following: levels of income, gross regional 
product, percentage of GRP from industry, and unemployment. 
1. Distance from Beijing (Political Control) 
Traditional political history of China is a cycle of dynasties stretching across 
thousands of years of history. As dynasties waxed and waned throughout history, so too 
did the level of influence and control over its outer territories. From this cycle came the 
idiom that “the mountains are high and the Emperor is far away.” Although the level of 
central control exerted by Mao contradicted the idiom, as Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms began to take root, local authorities began to again gain greater latitude in their 
decision-making and enforcement, particularly over economic issues. Table 1 indicates 
that while not a 1:1 correlation, distance from Beijing is a contributing factor. 
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Table 1.   Distances (in miles) from Beijing to the Provincial Capital 
 
Data collated from maps204 and distance calculators.205 For data on number of protests 
per province, see Appendix. 
While distance does appear to be a factor, an interesting correlation appears 
centered on the North-South divide, with the eastern end beginning on the northern 
border of Shanghai. The number of protests reported north of Shanghai appears to be 
single instances, not a recurring pattern. Starting in Shanghai, however, and continuing 
into the southern, coastal provinces, the number of reported protests grows. The number 
of protests within a particular province is not static over the decade, but the number of 
protests appears to be increasing, not just number of locations, but also in frequency—
particularly within the southern provinces. 
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2. Internal Migration 
Since the opening of reforms, China’s economic engines have relied on the large 
pool of domestic labor to feed its early growth.206 This has led to a huge “floating 
population—over 100 million and growing.”207 Yet, because of its reliance on this 
floating population to continue economic growth on one hand and growing inequality 
stemming from the hukou system on the other, internal migration contributes to 
governmental fears of instability.208 Figure 7 shows two maps of migration patterns in 
the early 1990s and 2006 
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Source (top): Sandra Poncet and Nong Zhu, “Country People Moving to the Cities: The 
Migratory Dynamic,” China Perspectives [Online], 62 (November to December 2005)209 
(bottom) China’s Migrant Workforce—A Special Report.210 
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The above maps (Figure 7) demonstrate similarities of migration patterns between 
the first map (1995) and the second (2006). Many of these internal migrants moved to 
other provinces through an institutionalized, but informal network of friends and relatives 
who would assist the migrant in acquiring work.211 The regions these migrants leave 
represent some of most polluted and leave fewer people behind who could protest. While 
this explanation one possible correlation, further research is required before any stronger 
causal links could be drawn. 
3. Levels of Environmental Degradation 
A testament to the level of environmental degradation, environmentalists have 
mapped the location of some of China’s “cancer villages.” A cancer village is an area 
dominated by a factory or industrial complex where the soil and water are severely 
contaminated, often by heavy metals.212 These areas, largely rural, have extremely high 
rates of cancer, usually either related to respiratory or stomach ailments.213 “In 2010, 
Chinese journalist Deng Fei published a map highlighting a number of China's ‘cancer 
villages’”214 and Figure 8 compares the recorded location of cancer villages against the 
location of reported protests. 
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Figure 8.  Map of Cancer Village Locations versus Sites of Protest 
 
“Cancer villages” (Left); Composite (Center); Protests (Right)Red = 2005-2014 / 
Green = 2015 
 
Source: (Left) From: Fei, “China’s Cancer Villages 215; (Center) After: Fei, “China’s 
Cancer Villages”; (Right) “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix 
In Figure 8, one possible measure for environmental degradation is shown (at 
left). The blue markers show some of the most concentrated areas of environmental 
degradation and many of these areas correlate to arable farmland where China’s food is 
grown. The red and green markers are the reported locations of various protests. Despite 
an almost equal number of blue and red markers, there is a large disparity between their 
locations.  
One explanation is the theory of generational memory or “shifting baseline 
syndrome.” This is the observation of how people within an area will lose perspective on 
ecological conditions due to a lack of inter-generational communication.216 Combined 
with the slow creep of environmental degradation over years where the severity of the 
degradation is unrecognized and the younger generation sees the condition as normal.217 
Alone, this theory is insufficient to explain the disparity; however, when combined with 
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the analysis from Table 1, another explanation is that the political opportunity for protest 
is much smaller in the areas of cancer villages.  
Although cancer villages offer one way of measuring environmental degradation, 
particularly soil pollution, there are other ways to measures environmental degradation. 
The maps in Figure 9 were correlated by the ENGO IPE and include levels of acidity in 
rainfall and coastal water quality. 
Figure 9.  Acid Rain (Left) and Coastal Water Quality (Right) 
  
Left: Acid rain in China by increasing of acidity; Source: 
Right: 2010 National Water Quality in Distribution Map; Source: “2012 Environment in 
China,” People’s Republic of China Ministry of Environmental Protection, from 
http://www.ipe.org.cn/En/pollution/picture5.aspx?cid=89&space=  
Levels of acid rain and poor coastal water quality correlates more to the location 
of protests shown in Figure 8, but are still insufficient as causation alone. When the data 
from Figures 8 and 9 is combined with the data in Figure 10, however, the relationship 
between environmental degradation, economics, and protest can be seen.  
4. Economic Explanations 
In a 2007 article, SEPA Deputy Minister, Pan Yue commented that “the main 
reason behind the continued deterioration of the environment is a mistaken view of what 
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counts as political achievement.” In his view, political achievement at the local and 
provincial levels has become tied to economic indicators. Minster Pan Yue continued, 
arguing that until “the crazy expansion of high-polluting, high-energy industries [which 
have] spawned special interests” within local governments and business are no longer 
able to “treat the natural resources that belong to all the people as their own private 
property,”218 China cannot fix its environmental issues. Figure 10 shows the economic 
disparities between the different provinces. 
Figure 10.  Economic Data Maps of China 
 
From: Matthew Hartzell, “Maps: China’s Uneven Economic Development,” Matt 
Hartell’s China Blog, September 11, 2013, 
http://matthartzell.blogspot.com/2013/09/chinas-economic-disparityin-maps.html.  
Social movement theory argues that most protests, and large scale-movements in 
particular, require a certain level of income before becoming viable. This theory contends 
that sufficient resources, today equated to the middle class, are necessary for protests to 
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evolve.219 This seems to correlate with Figures 7, 8, and 9 to show why the majority of 
protests occurred in the coastal provinces, which are also among the provinces with the 
highest levels of disposable income—urban and rural. Figure 11 shows the range of 
income versus population levels as factors and the size of the circle correlates to number 
of protests within the province.  
Figure 11.  Income versus Population 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
The size of the province, by total population, does not appear to correlate to the 
number of protests within a given province. While population size does not correlate, 
there seems to be slight correlation between protests and the level of gross regional 
product of the province (GRP). This provides support for the theory that a level of wealth 
is necessary before mass protests. Of note, is the gap, slightly right of center, in which no 
protests occur. The primary reason is that wealth of provinces jumps from approximately 
37 billion Yuan to approximately 59 billion Yuan.220 According to Chinese official data, 
there is a single province in between this gap, at approximately 54 billion Yuan, 
Shandong, but no protests were mentioned in this province during the timeframe, 
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possibly due to its location between Beijing and Shanghai.221 The level of GRP within a 
province is an important economic indicator, but in China, the percentage of GRP 
contributed by industry, shown in Figure 12, is directly proportional to the regional GRP 
for the listed provinces.  
Figure 12.  Industrialization 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
Although the idea of industrialization as a factor would seem intuitive, Figure 12 
shows that level of industrialization is not as relevant as GRP. The greatest outlier, 
Jiangsu, contains both a high GRP and a high level of industrialization, yet is north of 
Shanghai. Therefore, combining Figure 12 with Table 1 (Distance from Beijing) explains 
the difference in protest numbers between Guangdong and Jiangsu, which have similar 
GRP and industrialization levels. This indicates that economic factors being equal, 
distance from Beijing becomes a more prominent indicator of whether or not protests will 
occur. (There is also the possibility that distance from Beijing is less an indicator of a 
protest occurring, as it is an indicator of the protest being reported in the media.) The 
final economic factor discussed is the percentage of unemployment, shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  Unemployment Percentage versus Protests 
 
Source: “Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014),” see Appendix. 
“The value of R is 0.2224. Although technically a positive 
correlation, the relationship between your variables is 
weak (the nearer the value is to zero, the weaker the 
relationship). The value of R2, the coefficient of 
determination, is 0.0495.”222 
Based on Figure 13, the majority of protests appear to be in provinces that have 
between 2–4 percent unemployment. Yet, just as many provinces with similar levels of 
unemployment had zero protests. Both the graph and the statistical test suggest that 
unemployment is not a significant factor in explaining the presence of environmental 
protests.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The series of figures and tables in Chapter III show that there is no single factor, 
but instead a variety of factors that affect the size and frequency of protests. Without 
further research and larger data sets, this analysis indicates general trends and the 
elimination of unemployment as a relevant variable. While conclusive statements cannot 
be drawn yet from the available information presented here, the combination of several 
                                                 























graphs, particularly provincial wealth (Figure 10), economic degradation (Figures 8 and 
9), and distance from Beijing (Table 1) begin to offer strong hypotheses why protests 
occur more frequently in some areas rather than others. Using social movement theory, 
and drawing heavily from the experience of food riots, both early modern and 
contemporary, Chapter IV will offer a qualitative analysis as to how the data fits into with 
the wider literature. 
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IV. CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTESTS, 
FOLLOWING THE PATTERN 
 Over the last half-century, China has undergone two radical transformations, 
from “sick man of Asia” to totalitarian communism to a semi-authoritarian state with a 
free market economic system. The economic transformation from communist state-led to 
a majority market-based system was a gradual process affecting all segments of state and 
society. Like all industrialized nations, the environment suffered heavily as China 
modernized but over the last decade, the Chinese have begun to understand the societal 
cost of environmental pollution. Environmental protests are one of the top three triggers 
of street protests in China and government officials are increasingly vocal about the need 
to clean up the environment.223 
Chapter III analyzed the quantifiable characteristics of Chinese environmental 
protests from the given dataset. The most interesting conclusion was the apparent lack of 
causation between incidents of protest and either unemployment or overall level of 
environmental degradation. According to this data, the two greatest single indicators of 
whether or not a protest may occur appear to be the distance from Beijing and the 
economic level of the province. What does this mean for why and when Chinese protest? 
This chapter will explain the characteristics of the Chinese street protests and how 
China’s environmentalism has evolved to become a nascent environmental movement by 
utilizing comparative data with social movements worldwide. 
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 
The study of social movements is related to the broader category of contentious 
politics. Contentious politics can be defined as the collective action of regular citizens 
acting to confront opponents or authorities.224 If sustained over time and solidified 
around a specific issue or narrative, such collective action may coalesce into a social 
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movement.225 As recently as 2006, some authors argued that China’s environmentalism 
had not yet met the definition of “sustained” and thus was not an environmental 
movement.226 While the many environmental protests remain sporadic and 
geographically limited, the increasing frequency of environmental protests, particularly 
the comparative frequency of PX protests (Chapter III, Figures 1–2) and signs of “sister 
protests” indicate that China’s environmentalism is a nascent environmental movement, 
more analogous to food riots than the environ-democratization movements in Eastern 
Europe.227 Although there are various ways to describe the diverse nature of social 
movements, this chapter focuses on those facets of social movement theory, which best 
explains Chinese environmental protests.  
While the Chinese often use the phrase “Chinese characteristics” in relations to 
many of their endeavors, the overarching characteristics of Chinese protests are similar to 
other social movements and not specifically unique to China. Any single protest, in any 
given country, can be sparked by a host of variables, but if viewed within a larger 
framework or over an extended time period patterns may emerge. For example, a single 
protest may be spontaneous, but repeated protests within a limited geographic area or a 
single protest sustained over several days, shows a degree of organization. Chinese 
environmental street protests are episodic but there is a growing continuity and 
connectivity between protestors, ENGOs, government officials, and wider society. At 
times, these protests have also shown a minimum level of organization, maintaining 
occupation of compounds or sustaining street protests for several days228 The analysis 
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here suggests that the Chinese environmental movement may to be shifting from single, 
episodic NIMBY protests to a sustained social movement with national scale.  
Although the “Chinese characteristics” of the environmental movement are 
similar to other social movements, modern China’s attempts to combine Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy, Mao Zedong Though and Deng Xiaoping’s modernizations have created a 
unique political philosophy. This political ideology demonstrates a contradiction useful 
for framing China’s environmental protests—a fundamental dichotomy between 
centralized political control and the importance of the masses. Under this ideology, 
leaders claim that “consultation of the masses [is] indispensable for policy making and 
implementation”229 while simultaneously arguing that all reforms must be state-led and 
driven from the top-down. This dichotomy is rooted deeply in the Chinese psyche. 
Collective bargaining and contentious politics have a long tradition in Chinese history, 
and Communist ideology, in theory, institutionalizes contentious politics through mass 
campaigns and mobilizations.230 In practice, however, Communist regimes have strongly 
opposed any mass participation that challenged the ruling elite.231 To prevent a strong 
government response, the rhetoric of environmental protests is couched in specifically 
apolitical language.232 The most successful protests seem to be those aimed at multi-
national companies (MNCs).233 MNCs have less political backing and may be seen as a 
                                                 
229 Xi Chen, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China (Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 14. 
230 Ibid., 40. 
231 Ibid., 4. 
232 Thompson, Customs in Common, 208; Kevin J. O’Brien, “Rightful Resistance Revisited,” Journal 
of Peasant Studies 40, no. 6 (November 2013): 1051–62, doi:10.1080/03066150.2013.821466. 
233 Zhang and Barr, Green Politics in China, 81–2; Geall and Hilton, China and the Environment, 
145–150. 
Two of the biggest successes are the fight between IPE’s Green Alliance and Apple and Tenglong 
Aromatic PX plant in Xiamen. In the first case, Apple initially ignored evidence of pollution from their 
Chinese suppliers until the alliance grew to include two American NGOs at that time Apple conceded to 
conduct independent environmental assessments. The second case was a controversial PX plant planned for 
construction in Xiamen, Fujian by a Taiwanese businessman. The businessman’s domestic political 
connections began to fail shortly before the protests began, and the plant was eventually moved twice 
before settling in a poorer area of Fujian province. 
 68
more acceptable target by both protestors and officials.234 Unfortunately, the dataset for 
this thesis is not sufficient to conclude if a company’s status as an MNC opens it to more 
protests than other polluters. 
Growing under the shadow of an authoritarian state, the Chinese environmental 
movement can be characterized as a norm-oriented, reformation focused movement.235 
There is a preference to work from within the system for limited reforms. Despite this 
preference for working from an embedded position within the existing structure, the 
existence and occurrence of street protests indicate that people are also willing to work 
outside the system in extra-institutional ways when the system fails.236 Since 2007, when 
Ho and Edmonds argued that China’s environmental movement could not be considered a 
traditional social movement, Chinese society seems increasingly willing and accustomed 
to extra-institutional action.237 While the major environmental actors remain embedded 
on a continuum between full autonomy and state-control, there are signs that the 
fragmented nature of the environmental movement is changing. Signs of connectivity are 
increasingly apparent.238 Although leaders among the environmental movement’s diverse 
groups operate independently, their efforts often appear to be coordinated to serve the 
aggregate.239 While there are increased signs of coordination, the movement is unlikely 
to develop a single leader as to do so invites too much government attention and may 
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ultimately weaken the movement due to the socio-political constraints of reform within a 
semi-authoritarian system. 
Although reform orientated, the growing social movement is increasingly 
contentious. The Chinese environmental movement’s lack of historical precedent for care 
of the environment or strong enforcement means that the demands are proactive in nature, 
even if they are cloaked in reactive language.240 A proactive movement is one in which 
the demands of protestors are for new or expanded rights, enforcement, or legislation. A 
truly reactive movement would be one that wished a return of a previous status quo 
arrangement between government and populace. Therefore, China’s environmental 
protests are proactive because they are demanding the enforcement of laws inconsistently 
enforced, if enforced at all. Yet, they cloak their demands in the language of a reactive 
protest, seeking redress for rights he has been deprived of, but never actually had claim to 
previously.241  
As awareness of environmental consequences increases and the state of the 
environment continues to decrease, more Chinese citizens are starting to see the potential 
loss equated with failing to clean up the environment.242 Combined with the easing of 
civil society regulations and opportunity over the last decade, bolder actions such as 
street protests appear to have grown. Another factor in the assessment of risk may stem 
from the narrative chosen by environmentalists as one that does not seek to overthrow the 
current way of life, but instead restore China’s environment to a previous (ideal) state.243 
B. CHINA’S GROWING ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT  
China is a single-party semi-authoritarian state, but street protests occur, often 
without outside attention. Since the start of reforms in the 1980s, the number of “mass 
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incidents” in China has grown.244 While “mass incidents” covers a broad spectrum of 
collective action, from a few peasants submitting petitions to the local government to 
street demonstrations or clashes with police, the focus of this thesis is on the growing 
number of street protests. Although many remember the tragedy of June 4, 1989 in 
Tiananmen Square, Beijing, Tiananmen was only one of dozens of protests subdued that 
week.245 Immediately following the crackdown, there seems to have been a lull in the 
number of mass incidents, but in the last decade and a half, this number has begun to 
grow again.246  
Many of the street protests documented for this study were sparked by local fears 
of increased pollution. These NIMBY-style protests were a reaction to a perceived threat 
to community health.247 A second, smaller category of protests were those in response to 
an accident that disrupted the routine and was an obvious case of negligence rather than 
an honest error or “act of God,”248 
Although there are always reasons for people to protest, there have been relatively 
few social movements with sustained protests throughout history. Numerous protests are 
not, of themselves enough to form a social movement. There must be an overarching 
narrative (or frame), coordination, sustained mobilization, and the sharing of 
resources.249 In China, environmental street protests have been occurring sporadically for 
over a decade, with ENGOs providing resources, networks, and awareness for two 
decades. Together, they have begun coalescing into a sustained movement. One of the 
greatest challenges facing the future of the Chinese environmental movement is how to 
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shift from the current dependency on charismatic leaders to a decentralized, networked 
group of activists. Finally, within the last few years, the framing portion of the movement 
has begun to emerge in a way that borrows government rhetoric and brings people into 
the streets.  
1. Issues: Why Are the Chinese Protesting? 
What issues cause people to protest and which ones do not draw people into the 
street? Why protest PX and waste incinerators, but not air quality? If water and soil 
pollution is as bad as some Western environmentalists claim, why are there not more 
protests related to soil and water?250  
People do not resort to street protests because of lax enforcement, or in response 
to government inaction alone. Street protests are most often a response to disruption in 
either the daily status quo or when a moral outrage has reached the point where it can no 
longer be ignored.251 The cause of any riot or protest therefore, is neither natural nor 
obvious.252 During bread riots, it is not the most hungry and desperate who protest. 
Rather those who still have something to gain by acting in “a sophisticated pattern of 
collective behavior, a collective alternative to individualistic and familial strategies of 
survival.”253 
According to Hobsbawm, in Western Europe between the mid-1500s to mid-
1800s, food riots were the most common forms of collective bargaining. Other riots, over 
religion, land, elections, labor, and military conscription, also occurred but by the 1800s 
food riots were the most frequent.254 Similarly, in China, although protests are not often 
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termed riots, similar subjects often spark a protest, including land and labor.255 During 
early modern European bread riots, the state imposed free market capitalism and removed 
protectionist practices. People responded with outrage and protests.256 The riots were 
often a response to reforms that eliminated protection for consumers.257 A similar 
dynamic occurred in modern food riots.258 In China, environmental protests are not a 
response to removed protection, but a response to inconsistent follow-through on existing 
laws. 
Protests, such as the protest against a chemical factory in Dalian after a typhoon 
broke the Pacific sea wall, exemplify the concept “disruption of the quotidian.”259 The 
quotidian is the everyday routine or daily life.260 If this routine is disrupted by an 
accident, obviously the result of negligence or error, not caused by natural forces there is 
a higher probability the incident will generate collective action.261 In China, the level of 
disruption that correlates to street protests is hard to define as numerous variables, not 
least of which is levels of threat and opportunity, factor into the decision to contend with 
a semi-authoritarian state. A subset of quotidian disruption focuses on how people’s 
perception of levels of risk change depending on whether the protests are preventing 
further loss or attempting to gain a benefit. Accordingly, people are less risk-averse if the 
result of failure is loss, but can be more risk-averse if the net outcome is gain.262 
As ENGOs increase awareness among the average citizen of the long-term health 
consequences and how Western nations force companies to mitigate the worst effects, 
more people may be willing to initiate street protests. The protests noted in this study, 
show that current protests are largely sparked by an alteration to the current routine or 
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diminishment of a common good, such as clean air.263 They are initiated to either counter 
a perceived future threat, or represent the breaking point of a beleaguered community.264 
The collective action taken by street protests are mostly limited attempts to prevent 
further degradation, not focused on the long-term need to reverse pollution.  
The most interesting finding was the issues that did not draw people into the 
streets. For example, there were three reported instances of protests against soil pollution 
due to high levels of lead found in children’s blood.265 In the cases of protests against 
lead poisoning, the pollution had existed for years, but only recently had children begun 
to fall seriously ill. Combined with newly available information on lead poisoning and a 
lack of government response three villages resorted to street protests.266 Yet, according to 
partially released government survey results, heavy metal pollution is present in 
approximately 16 percent of China’s soil and 19.4 percent of its farmland.267 Why are 
there not more incidents of protest?  
Another obvious gap is the lack of street protests reported surrounding the issue 
of PM2.5 and city air quality. The largest number of street protests reported, were people 
protesting the planning or construction of a new factory not the pollution already in the 
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air.268 People were willing to protest the building of a new incinerator, but there are no 
reports of protests over having to keep children inside due to health risks.269 Why were 
people unwilling to protest high levels of lead poisoning, but not the toxicity of city air? 
One explanation may be that there is no focus for the anger. Without a strong 
narrative and a focal point, people are not willing to mobilize physically in opposition to 
the government. Those who protest are not people acting in isolation, but a collective 
response to a crisis, real or perceived.270 Without a strong narrative, collective action 
may not be possible. Another explanation may be that people are willing to forego street 
protests in cities with active ENGOs if they feel there is a less risky route to the same 
goal. The absence of street protest does not mean there are no pressure on government, 
just that it is subtler and being done in a manner that is not reported on by newspapers or 
blogs. A final explanation is that the limitations of collecting the dataset used in this 
study hindered the ability to get a fully comprehensive view of all protests within the 
decade. 
Neither the protests in China, nor bread riots in any age, require high levels of 
organization, but they do require “a consensus of support in the community, and an 
inherited pattern of action.”271 In both cases, protestors focused their objectives on the 
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near term and were limited in scope.272 The support of the community and the focus on 
apolitical, limited goals are particularly important in Chinese street protests. One 
common tool to defuse an extended sit-in or protestor is for officials to contact family 
members. The government may then strongly suggest that family elders encourage 
protestors to peacefully disband, threatening to blacklist or arrest those who refuse to 
comply.273 If the community and family members are not in full support, these tactics can 
be extremely successful. 
2. Political Opportunity: When and Where Are the Chinese Protesting? 
A second aspect of social movement theory, political opportunity, may explain 
why Chinese protest in some location and not in others. Chapter III, Figure 7, suggests 
that the location of protests does not directly correlate to the level of environmental 
degradation, but that there was a strong correlation between the number of street protests 
and the distance from Beijing (Chapter III, Table 1). Political opportunity is the 
combination of increased perception of a “set of clues that encourages people to engage 
in contentious politics” and decreased threat, or factors which discourage contentious 
politics.274 Another variable when discussing political opportunity is risk calculation. 
Individuals who face loss have a much higher tolerance of risk than those who fight 
solely for gain. If individuals are more risk-averse when seeking gain and less risk-averse 
if combating potential loss, the health-risks associated with a heavily contaminated 
environment may exaggerate political opportunity and explain why the total number of 
protests seems to be rising.275 
In China, the level of political opportunity constantly shifts, but the growth of 
Chinese street protests, in the past decade, indicates a growing willingness to use 
confrontational tactics. The most common type of political opportunity exploitation seen 
in Chinese protests is factional politics, either between different segments of the 
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bureaucracy or between different levels of government, for example provincial versus 
national elites.276 Chinese Party elites have become accustomed to manipulating the 
masses to their advantage in factional strife, but maintaining control of the masses is 
increasingly difficult. Party doctrine argues that “political power be concentrated in Party 
leaders,” but also claims that “consultation of the masses is indispensable for policy 
making and implementation.”277 Street protestors often take advantage of this rhetoric 
when protesting and the use of “troublemaking tactics” such as street protests even lends 
greater legitimacy to complaints.278 A common complaint among environmental 
protestors is the lack of consultation in accordance with government policy.279 
In several of the NIMBY-style protests, a protest occurred when locals learned of 
a new project late in the process and local officials ignored peaceful petitions. After 
petitions failed, or if the nature of the project was discovered once construction had 
begun, people took to the streets in anger. Some protests were followed by a period of 
negotiation in which the government agreed to the temporary suspension of the 
contentious project and greater consultation with the local populace.280 In other cases, the 
government appeared to give in to public pressure, but only waited for emotions to cool 
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before quietly restarting the project—occasionally with adjustments or fines levied.281 At 
other times, local governments relocated the project to a less contentious area282 or 
silenced dissent.283 The protests with the greatest possibility of having a long-term 
positive impact on the environment, however, were those that also mobilized ancillary, 
less contentious efforts by local ENGOs. In these examples, the pressure did not cease 
with the end of street demonstrations. Instead, the protests served to create greater 
awareness among the local population and pressure was quietly maintained after street 
protests ended in order to effect lasting change.284  
During bread riots, both early modern and contemporary, protesters use similar 
tactics. Locals would focus the anger on outsiders, while appealing to local gentry,285 but 
consultation rhetoric is not the only government language used by protestors. Protestors 
also take advantage of anti-corruption and pro-environment rhetoric to appeal for aid 
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from the central government against local elites.286 In such instances, protestors attempt 
to gain outside notice and plead their case to the center, not necessarily out of strong 
belief, but a mix of hope that the center will side with the masses and step in to enforce 
government laws and policies.287 This exploitation of divisions between local and central 
elites may be perceived to mitigate the risk of protesting by adopting language supportive 
of the central regime’s stated priorities.288 
The frequency of street protests and degree of openness or opportunity may also 
correlate to their distance from Beijing. Officials in Beijing and its surrounding provinces 
may possibly have fewer public divisions that could be exploited. They may also be more 
sensitive to protests in this region, giving a threat of protest greater weight than in 
southern provinces where threats to protests must be carried out in order to be effective. 
In other collective action, such as early bread riots, there were protests in both England 
and Ireland. Eventually, however, the riots ceased in Ireland, possibly because “rioters 
had less ‘political’ clout in Ireland” and thus riots did not work.289 In China, there seems 
to be a “sweet spot” for protests. Closer to the center, directly around Beijing, greater 
political influence may translate to fewer riots. Yet as you gain distance from Beijing, the 
number of riots increase heading south, and into the middle provinces, but when you 
reach the farthest provinces protests again decline. 
3. Framing and Tactics: How Are the Chinese Protesting? 
The final aspects to social movement theory are framing and tactics, or how are 
issues communicated to draw people into the street? What is the relationship between 
single-issue NIMBY street protests and the growing environmental movement? In 
reference to the majority of protests in China, “there can be no doubt that the actions [are] 
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approved by an overwhelming popular consensus.”290 Just as during English bread riots, 
there was a deeply felt conviction that the state should regulate grain prices;291 in China, 
there is a growing conviction that corporations should be held responsible for their 
actions—particularly in regards to the pollution of the environment. 
Those who protest appear to be angry locals directly affected by the polluters or 
the proposed new construction. ENGOs and civic organizations seem to be foregoing a 
presence in street protests.292 Despite keeping a necessary distance form street protests, 
recognized ENGOs offer education to the general population on the dangers of pollution 
and their meetings offer a place for like-minded activists to meet and discuss in a 
legitimate manner. The environmental protests are unique amongst the thousands of other 
protest in China because they are showing signs of a nascent social movement, growing 
and repeating lessons learned from previous protests in other parts of the country. They 
have also begun to appear in multiple locations. In April 2014, a protest in Maoming 
against the construction of a new PX plant spawned “sister demonstrations” in two 
nearby cities.293 Although as quickly as protestors learn, so too the government. The CCP 
now teaches major street protests, and government responses as case studies to Party 
members.294 Such is the cycle of protest and repression. 
C. CONCLUSION 
While a cynic might argue that environmental protection cannot succeed so long 
as the government remains focused on development, citizens are becoming increasingly 
aware of the dangers of allowing unchecked pollution.295 The Chinese environmental 
movement is a professional mixture of lawyers, journalists, full-time activists, and 
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volunteers working under formal organization structures.296 The movement seems almost 
entirely indigenous and growing in a cautious manner fitting a semi-authoritarian state. 
The rise of protests is a sign that people are willing to engage in contentious actions to 
challenge the state on issues that directly affect their health and well-being. As this 
momentum grows, civil society grows as well. NGOs are finding new ways to pressure 
the government over issues, which do not challenge the Party’s political monopoly. As 
ENGOs continue to learn how to best to pressure for long-term changes, government 
rhetoric is also increasingly in the favor of environmental reform.297 Social movement 
theory explains the growth of environmental protests as the next step to building a 
comprehensive environmental movement, but many unsolved questions remain.  
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Concern over China’s future and, its environment in particular, continues to grow. 
Although the CCP appears to have conceded environmental issues as an area in which 
people may challenge commercial and governmental actions, the government is still leery 
of social unrest or large demonstrations of any kind. China’s environmental protests are 
increasingly attracting attention from all levels of the Chinese government as well as 
from Western media, but China’s environmental movement is just beginning to coalesce 
into sustained collective action. China’s environmentalism has matured into an 
environmental movement focused solely on the environment and not on larger 
democratization concerns. As the movement continues to grow in size and legitimacy, the 
CCP will continue to co-opt or repress these street protests, using them to maintain their 
political monopoly.298 
These street protests are not only occurring more often, they are being reported 
both internally and internationally with a greater frequency. As protests continue, the 
government faces increasing challenges in maintaining stability. Each successful protest 
encourages the next and protesters have begun holding protests in secondary cities to 
support the issues. While there is no single cause, a variety of factors based on region, 
economic status, and other variables affect the size of protests. The decision whether or 
not to initiate a street protest appears to depend on multiple hierarchical factors as 
follows, in descending order: location, degree of disposable income, levels of pollution, 
and finally other economic factors. 
 Based on this preliminary research a few concrete conclusions can be offered. 
First, the elimination of unemployment as a variable is supported. Second, it is clear that 
as citizens become aware of the dangers of unchecked pollution, protests will continue as 
more people become willing to challenge the state over issues that directly affect their 
health and those of their families.  
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As awareness grows, so will China’s nascent environmental movement. A largely 
indigenous movement, the Chinese environmental movement is a professional mixture of 
lawyers, journalists, full-time activists, and volunteers who are increasingly networked. 
This movement, combined with a more active and vibrant civil society will continue to 
support the state by working within the current political system to effect change. As the 
momentum grows, ENGOs are finding new ways to pressure the government over 
environmental issues, without directly challenging the Party’s political monopoly. The 
rest of this chapter will summarize the findings of the previous chapters and attempt to 
extrapolate cautious predictions for the near future; offer areas of further research to build 
upon this study; and look at the probable impact of a new security law passed during the 
summer of 2015 on Chinese civil society and the environmental movement.  
A. CHINA, 2015 
Since China began its efforts to open its economy, it has focused on development. 
This singular focus on development relegated cleaning the environment and social 
welfare to individuals and private organizations. As the government retreated further 
from the private lives and social responsibility, civil society grew to fill the void; 
however, it could not do so at a pace equal to the governmental retreat. Although the 
government has come to acknowledge the need for limited civil society, it remains leery 
of many non-profits, particularly those that are foreign funded or focused on human 
rights, due to their potential to shift focus from limited societal issues to full 
democratization.  
While civil society has grown in incremental steps over the last thirty-five years, 
the level of attention for environmental awareness has grown exponentially over the last 
decade and a half. Since the 1980s, China has slowly brought its environmental 
regulations in line with the international community. Unfortunately, China’s enforcement 
capacity of environmental laws is extremely weak and has not developed at the same rate 
as regulations. Without greater financial support, more people, and increased 
enforcement, China’s environmental regulations will not be enough to prevent the 
continued degradation of the environment—to the world’s peril. 
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Environmental issues are slowly being recognized as a transnational, global 
threat, and the widespread degradation in China is increasingly at the forefront of 
international environmentalist’s ire. Through the Internet and international assistance, the 
increased focus of international environmentalists on China and the growing 
understanding within China of environmental contamination are reinforcing each other. 
The more informed the public, the greater the likelihood of protest. Increased 
dissemination outside official government channels is slowly allowing China’s civil 
society to coalesce and reach past local barriers.  
Looking at the trends and data discussed in the previous chapters, we can begin to 
see some trend lines that, all things remaining equal, may lead to cautious predictions. 
Chapters III and IV offer an explanation of why protests occur where they do—
divergence of political opportunity, education, and emotion—but what does this mean for 
the future? The data suggests that the reporting of protests is growing; this may also 
correlate to a growth in protests. In the first six months of 2015, there had already been 
almost as many protests reported as any previous year—nine compared to the previous 
high of ten in 2009. For environmentalists this is an encouraging sign, but it does not 
mean the government is willing to concede. Government officials are still willing to send 
in police or paramilitary to break up protests that are seen as growing too large or unruly 
or disruptive. The greatest impact from the protests is not a reduction of repressive 
responses, but an increased awareness of why people are willing to protesting. If 
reporting continues to grow, then pressure on the government is likely to eventually reach 
levels that will lead to significant changes or risk taking new forms, such as challenging 
government legitimacy. 
The growing environmental movement indicates an increased maturity of China’s 
civil society, but does not show signs of linking with other movements or transforming 
into a force for democratization. The largest influences on the environmental movement 
fall into two categories, celebrities on social media who post information and follow 
protests, informing others, but are not physically involved, and protestors or bystanders 
who film the protests and government responses. In the case of the first category, the 
celebrities are popular on social media, in part, because they are already a part of China’s 
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culture and use their fame to support the environmental movement. Other influencers are 
the leaders of the various ENGOs who by in large appear to believe that the best way to 
affect change in China is by remaining apolitical and therefore able to continue fighting 
for improvements, but who avoid direct, extra-institutional conflict when possible. 
In the near-term, the next five years, the CCP will be able to continue to co-opt 
civil society through intimidation and repression. Civil society organizers, particularly 
those within the environmental movement, continue to see the hope of progress and so 
believe that better results can come from pushing boundaries within the system, not 
fighting directly against and inviting stronger responses. An example of positive signs is 
the new Environmental Protection Law, which promises stronger repercussions against 
polluting companies.299 Another positive indication of increased governmental support 
would be a strengthening of the Green Courts in a manner that shows Beijing’s 
willingness to back the judges against state-owned enterprises or other major polluters. 
Looking out five to ten years, the ability of the state to co-opt environmentalists will 
largely depend on whether or not new laws live up to expectations.  
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
The biggest area for improvement on this research is with a broader dataset. 
Greater clarity on how widespread protests over the environment truly are would best 
come from governmental statistics. Government statistics would give a better overall 
trend and allow for a large-n study and clarity at both national and provincial levels as 
well as a better analysis and comparison of the provinces not analyzed in this study. 
Another way for better data would be to conduct on the ground interviews with 
protests either during or after a protest. While such a data may be less comprehensive, it 
might offer different insights into causes of protests and sentiment of protesters. For 
instance, no data exists for the level of mistrust of official statements concerning 
environmental impact. There may be a relation between mistrust and incidents of street 
protest. In many of the articles and some of the literature, mistrust was cited as a factor in 
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environmental protests, but was left out of this study due to insufficient data or 
understanding. The best way to correct the lack of understanding would be to conduct 
interviews during or immediately following protests. While protester interviews would be 
biased they would also offer a supplementary point of view and insight. 
Neither government data nor on-the-ground interviews would provide clarity on 
government reporting statistics or how the media covers different topics or protests. A 
study of media coverage, including sentiment analysis of reports from various sources, 
could provide further insights into how different topics are viewed by the various actors. 
As well as traditional media, analysis of social media coverage may offer insight into 
influencers and citizen response to government actions. In order to conduct this type of 
study, one would need to understand Chinese. It might be possible to conduct a social 
network analysis of China’s environmental movement via Twitter, but to do so would 
highly bias the sample to those who are capable of and interested in circumventing 
China’s “Great Firewall” Internet barriers. Another option would be to conduct a similar 
analysis of Sina Weibo based on the types of software available for analysis of 
Twitter.300  
Other areas for further research would be the intersection between protests and 
China’s internal migrants. China estimates that there are 260 million internal migrant 
workers within the country, or about 20 percent of the Chinese population.301 Of the 
migrant population, approximately one half are under 35 years old, many of them even 
growing up within the city and identifying the city, not their village, as home.302 This 
same population is also unable to access the benefits of living within a city in which they 
live and work, often making very little in comparison to their urban counterparts with 
resident IDs. Due to the high levels of networking, increased connectivity via technology, 
and informal associations within urban areas the undercurrent of tension within Chinese 
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cities is rising.303 Does this tension add to desire for protest by urban residents? Do 
migrants join the protests? This would be another promising area to investigate. 
C. CIVIL SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS  
On March 1, 2015, the Chinese Internet was rocked by a lecture video in the style 
of a TED talk posted by the People’s Daily Online. The video was a talk given by 
activist, journalist Chai Jing and within one week, the video had received 200 million 
views, was translated via crowdsourcing, and then abruptly pulled from the Chinese 
Internet. By the end of the month, “Liu Xiangdong, former director of the environmental 
protection bureau of Shanxi Province who complained about his department’s lack of 
power in Chai Jing’s lecture video, was detained for alleged corruption,”304 and the editor 
who allowed the initial posting was detained for extortion.305  
The ability of the state to repress remains intact, but it must learn to co-opt those 
willing to work with the government or they will become increasingly radicalized. An 
example, of maintaining government supremacy and broadening repression tools was 
passed on July 1, 2015. The new national-security law authorized “‘all measures 
necessary’ to protect the country from hostile elements.” Under the broader provisions of 
this law, a new draft has been circulated “regulating foreign non-governmental 
organizations (sic) (NGOs) [and] is expected to pass” before the end of 2015.306 The new 
law is most likely aimed at foreign NGOs who are seen as a threat to the continued 
dominance of the CCP—in particular, groups working in the realm of “rule of law” or 
human rights and receive the majority or all funding from foreign (Western) sources. 
While the government may be seeking to ensure a better grasp on pervasive foreign 
influences, it is simultaneously allowing greater freedom for NGOs deemed non-political 
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who are focused on issues seen to enhance social stability. The new law also requires 
foreign NGOs to register with the Ministry of Public Security rather than the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs. This is in parallel with the softening of legislation in the domestic sector. 
Some social work organizations have been able to legally set up without requiring a 
sponsor and the amount of charitably giving domestically is increasing and being 
supported by the Party.307  
China’s environmentalism may have finally emerged as an environmental 
movement capable of broad, sustained contentious actions, but the government does not 
appear willing to continue tolerating threats to its survival. As civil society strengthens, 
so does the government’s fears of instability and loss of control. If China’s environmental 
movement does not begin to make swifter progress through embedded activities, China 
may see an increase of contentious actions and growing protests. Once street protests 
begin, they become much harder to control either by protest leaders, or through 
repression by force. Protests often take on a life of their own, evolving, radicalizing, and 
institutionalizing as they continue.308 The Chinese government understands this, and 
should move to work with ENGOs to force recalcitrant industries to follow the law or pay 
stiff, painful penalties. 
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APPENDIX. FIGURE/TABLE SOURCE DATA 
A. EXPLANATION OF DATA CODING 
Data. The data set was collated using major news outlets, bilingual blogs, and 
references to protests found in scholarly works. Internet sourcing used “environment,” 
“protest(s),” “China” and similar terms and phrases in search engines. In many cases, a 
reference to a protest was found in one location or article, and then the year, possible 
location, and major issue would be entered into the search engine to find more details 
about the incident. 
Timeline. 2005–2014 was chosen, due to limitations of available data pre-2005. 
There was a single data point for 2004, but it was eventually left out due to lack of other 
data points for 2004. A 10-year data set was chosen for ease of analysis with 2005 chosen 
as the first year and closing on December 2014. A separate data set was started for 2015 
(January—June). Nothing added after June as majority of writing was done in July and 
August. The format of “month-year” was chosen as too many articles or incidents had 
undefined or inexact start/ stop dates given. In many cases, a protest would be reported 
only once or another might mention how protestors had been out for several days. Other 
articles would refer to the month in which a protest occurred, but no further detail, or that 
a ‘stroll’ had taken place the previous week and the results were the topic of the article. 
When specific start dates were not listed, the default assumption was that the date 
published of the article was within the same month of the mentioned protest. 
City. Location was also a difficult detail to decipher below the provincial level. In 
order to consolidate the locations of protests into Figure 9, county, village, township, 
neighborhood, or city names were consolidated to form a best guess as to the location of 
the protest. Part of the issue with detailed location was the shifting reporting standards in 
which village/township/ county/ city locations were not used on an obvious standard, so 
while two articles were very clearly discussing the same protest, one would refer to a 
village, and another would reference the township or county, but not the smaller town/ 
village. The rest of the analysis was conducted at the provincial level because the 
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province was much easier to decipher than exact location. In addition, for the sake of 
analysis, most Chinese statistics are kept on the provincial levels and any micro-level 
analysis would have yielded fewer results. 
Numbers. Numbers were usually mentioned, but articles tended to be oblique 
(hundreds/ thousands), not specifics. In this case, the size was rounded to nearest tens 
place: thousands = 1,000, hundreds = 100. Oftentimes, articles did not always agree on 
the numbers in which case conservative averages were used to best estimate approximate 
size 
Issue. The way an issue was decided was based on declared complaint from 
protestors. Often, these protests were against a factory or chemical plant. If protestors 
mentioned a specific complain, that was used, if not, it was based on types of pollution 
most commonly associated with the specified industry. As environmental research is oft 
broken into air/water/soil, so too “overarching concerns” were air/water/soil pollutions. 
In the event that more than one type of pollution was mentioned, it was counted as a 
protest for both. Radiation as a concern was added later when it became clear that it was 
the only outlier, but did not fit under air pollution, the next closer. 
Results. Results were included in the below table, but only cursory discussed and 
generalized in Chapter IV. The return for attempting to codify results in a qualitative 
matter was later determined to be outside the scope of this thesis. Another reason it was 
dismissed was due to large time gaps between the cessation of protest and government 
action or inability to discover from within available news sources the actual long-term 
outcome. In many cases, the protests were either single occurrence with no discernable 
media follow-up, or in others, they were dispersed and follow-up may not have been 
possible. In others, temporary shutdowns were achieved but without access to Chinese 
sources on the ground, there was no way to verify the factory remained shut or if it had 
restarted. 
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B. DATA SETS 
Table 2.   Chinese Environmental Protests (2005–2014) 




City Zhejiang309 20,000+ Zhuxi Industrial Park: air/water/soil  
5 villages jailed; Jan 
2006 last factory (13 
total) shutdown 
Apr-05 Guideng Hunan310 600 Vanadium refining sediment: air 
Frustrated villagers raid/ 
destroyed factories 
May-05 Xiaochaoshui Hunan311 1,000 
Qingshui river fouling from 
molybdenum mining operations: water 
About 200 mining sites 
destroyed 
Jul-05 Jianxia Zhejiang312 600 Battery factory: soil 
1,000 workers taken 




Jul-05 Xinchang Zhejiang313 15,000 
Jingxing Pharmaceutical Chemical 
factory explosion: soil pollution 
Suppressed by force 
(3,000 paramilitary 
police bussed in) 
Aug-05 Meishan Zhejiang314 <100 
Tian Neng Battery Factory—lead 
poisoning: soil Factory burned 
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Factory—China Digital Times (CDT).” 
313 “Environmental Protests in China”; French, “Anger in China Rises.” 
314 “Toxic Waste Sparks.” 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
Apr-06 Quanzhou Fujian315 200 Sewage Plant: air & water pollution  
Jun-07 Xiamen Fujian316 10,000 
Started as SMS/ Internet campaign 
against Tenglong Aromatic PX  
plant317 
“100 members of 
prominent…National 
Committee of the 
Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative 
Conference also  











Jan-08  Shanghai320 100s Maglav train/ fear of radiation  
Mar-08 
Gulei 
Peninsula Fujian321 10,000 
PX plant initially planned  
for Xiamen 
Dozens injured/  
20 arrested; relocated 
outside Zhangzhou, 100 
km SW Xiamen 
                                                 
315 “Villagers Attack Factories over Pollution in Eastern China | Worldwatch Institute,” Worldwatch Institute, accessed July 10, 2015, 
http://www.worldwatch.org/villagers-attack-factories-over-pollution-eastern-china. 
316 Chan, “Villagers angry at losing Jiangmen uranium plant deal”; “Environmental Protests in China.” 
317 “People vs. Chemical Plant.” 
318 Andrew Jacobs, “Chinese Chemical Plant Site Moves After Outcry,” New York Times, January 15, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/15/world/asia/15fujian.html. 
319 Fei, “Shanghai Police Brutalize Property Owners with Pepper Spray and Tear Gas.” 
320 Kurtenbach, “Shanghai Residents Protest Maglev Train.” 
321 “Environmental Protests in China.” 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
May-08 Chengdu Sichuan322 400–500 Ethylene plant and oil refinery: air  
Aug-08 Changying Beijing323 Hundreds Refuse dump: air pollution 
Measures to reduce smell 
implemented 
Jan-09 Zhangzhou Fujian324 
Small, 
sporadic Tenglong PX plant: air 
Sporadic, no momentum; 
6 percent construction 
budget for 
“environmental 
protection”; PR push by 
gov’t 
Jul-09 Nansha Guangdong325 1,000+ 
Oil refinery and petrochemical plant by 
Sinopec and Kuwait Petroleum (initial 
deal struck 2007): air 
14 local officials called 




                                                 
322 Ibid.; Wong, “In China City, Protesters See Pollution Risk of New Plant”; Pauline Blount, “Chinese Middle-Class and Farmers Protest 
Petrochemical Plant in Chengdu,” Global Nonviolent Action Database, April 12, 2011, http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-middle-class-
and-farmers-protest-petrochemical-plant-chengdu-chengdu-stroll-2008. 
323 “NIMBY Protests: A Timeline of NIMBY Protests”; Jonathan Watts, “Chinese Protesters Return to Streets after Olympics,” Guardian, August 
30, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/31/beijing.pollution.protest. 
324 Jacobs, “Chinese Chemical Plant Site Moves After Outcry”; Wu Jin, “Suspended Xiamen PX Project May Restart in Zhangzhou,” 
China.org.cn, January 13, 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/news/2009-01/13/content_17101597.htm; Peng Liguo and Gong Junnan, “Will 
the Chinese Public Be Persuaded That PX Factories Are Safe?,” Chinadialogue, December 8, 2013, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/6280-Will-the-Chinese-public-be-persuaded-that-PX-factories-are-safe-. 
325 “Environmental Protests in China”; Branigan, “Chinese Citizens Set to Launch First Ever Environmental Lawsuit”; Zhu, “China Approves $5 
Billion Sinopec-Kuwait Oil Project.” 
326 Zeng, “Green Challenge to China’s Mega-Projects.” 
327 Caixiong, “Refining Giant: Sinopec Links with Kuwait Petroleum.” 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
Aug-09 Shuangqiao Hunan328 1,000 
Death of 2 villagers; Xianghe chemical 
factory- heavy metal pollution: water 
2 Environmental officials 
suspended; Plant boss 
arrested; Plant production 
halted, pending further 
investigation 
Aug-09 Quanzhou Fujian329 200 Faulty sewage infrastructure: water Died out 
Aug-09 Shenzhen Guangdong330 Small sit in Longgang Waste Incineration 
Aug-09 Chongqing Shaanxi331 Hundreds? 
Dongling Lead and Zinc Smelting 
company: Lead poisoning/ soil 
pollution 
Factory shut-down; 
615/731 Children tested 
positive lead poisoning; 
planned to reopen in 
2010; 11 public health 
officials disciplined 
Aug-09 Wugang Hunan332 1,000 Wugan Magnesium smelting plant: soil 
2 officials arrested; “no 
official approval”/ plant 
shutdown 
Sep-09 Fengwei Fujian333 10,000+ Pollution from refinery: air 
“Many deaths from 
cancer of the stomach 
and esophagus in recent 
years”; 2 thousand 
police, tear gas 
                                                 
328 “Environmental Protests in China”; “Chemical Plant Boss Held over Sudden Deaths.” 
329 “Environmental Protests in China.” 
330 Keith Bradsher, “China’s Incinerators Loom as a Global Hazard,” New York Times, August 12, 2009, sec. Business / Energy & Environment, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/business/energy-environment/12incinerate.html. 
331 Pearce, “As China’s Pollution Toll Grows, Protesters and Media Push Back.” 
332 “Environmental Protests in China”; Pearce, “As China’s Pollution Toll Grows, Protesters and Media Push Back.” 
333 “Urban Warfare in Fujian.” 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
Sep 09 Jiaoyang Fujian334 <100 Soil: Lead poisoning 
Huaqing battery factory 
suspended production; 
High levels of lead found 
in children’s blood 
Nov-09 
Panyu, 
Guangzhou Guangdong335 1,000+ Waste Incinerator: Air 
Closed/ relocated; 
recycling program 
Jul-10 Jingxi Guangxi336 1,000 Aluminum plant: soil  
Apr-11 Wuxi Jiangsu337 1,000+ Waste Incineration: air  
Aug-11 Dalien Liaoning338 12,000+ 
Fujia Chemical Factory Sea Wall 
breached by Typhoon; PX 
Government promised to 
shutdown/ relocate 
factory…In 2012, still 
expanding 
                                                 
334 “Protest against Suspected Lead Pollution Continues in E China English.” 
335 Sophie Beach, “Residents Protest Garbage Incinerator in Guangdong,” China Digital Times (CDT), November 22, 2009, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/11/residents-protest-garbage-incinerator-in-guangdong/; Watts, “Chinese Protesters Confront Police over Incinerator 
Plans in Guangzhou”; James Pomfret, “Hundreds in South China Oppose Waste Incinerator,” Reuters, November 23, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/23/us-china-environment-incinerator-idUSTRE5AM0JS20091123; Pauline Blount, “Guangzhou Residents 
Protest Incinerator, 2009,” Global Nonviolent Action Database, November 26, 2011, http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/guangzhou-residents-
protest-incinerator-2009; “NIMBY Protests: A Timeline of NIMBY Protests”; “Panyu Residents Victorious in Blocking Planned Incinerator, Expected 
to Meet 30% Recycling Target in Return,” New Energy and Environment Digest, December 12, 2009, http://needigest.com/2009/12/12/panyu-residents-
victorious-in-blocking-planned-incinerator-expected-to-meet-30-recycling-target-in-return/. 
336 “NIMBY Protests: A Timeline of NIMBY Protests.” 
337 “Thousands Protest Waste-Incineration Power Plant in Eastern China,” New Tang Dynasty Television, April 14, 2011, 
http://www.ntd.tv/en/news/china/20110414/63020-thousands-protest-wasteincineration-power-plant-in-eastern-china.html. 
338 “Environmental Protests in China”; Lafraniere and Wines, “Plant Protest Shows China’s Officials Under Pressure”; “Map: Protests Over Large 
Projects”; Patti Waldmeir, “China’s Pollution Time Bomb Highlighted,” Financial Times, October 29, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b02feebe-21d6-
11e2-b5d2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Y9M3MUmb; Jonathan Watts, “Controversial Chinese Chemical Plant Believed to Have Resumed Production,” 
Guardian, January 13, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/jan/13/chinese-chemical-plant. 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
Sep-11 Haining Zhejiang339 500 
Zhejiang Jinko Solar Co Ltd chemicals 
used in solar panel manufacturing: 
water pollution (dead fish) 
Ordered to halt product 
lines emitting toxic 
gases; approx. 20 people 
arrested; resumed in 
October after “corrective 
action” taken; paid 
$74,000 fine 
Dec-11 Haimen Guangdong340 30,000 Coal-fired power plant construction 
Construction  
cancelled 
Apr-12 Tianjin Tianjin341 1,000s Sino-Saudi PX plant (SINO-SABIC)  
Jul-12 Qidong Jiangsu342 1,000 Wastewater discharge: water343 
Pipeline expansion 
cancelled and factory 
remains open344 
                                                 
339 “Environmental Protests in China”; Elaine Kurtenbach, “Over 500 Villagers Protest China Factory Pollution,” U-T San Diego, September 18, 
2011, http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2011/sep/18/over-500-villagers-protest-china-factory-pollution/; Pauline Blount, “Chinese Farmers Protest 
Solar Panel Plant Pollution, Haining, 2011 | Global Nonviolent Action Database,” Global Nonviolent Action Database, June 10, 2011, 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-farmers-protest-solar-panel-plant-pollution-haining-2011; “Recent High-Profile Mass Protests in 
China,” BBC News, July 3, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-18684903. 
340 “Protests Flare in Southern Chinese Town of Haimen”; Oiwan Lam, “China: Guangdong Uprising, Now in Haimen,” Global Voices, December 
20, 2011, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/12/20/china-guangdong-uprising-now-in-haimen/; Gillian Wong, “China Major Protest Demands Halt to 
Planned Coal-Fired Power Plant,” World Post, December 20, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/20/china-major-protest_n_1160033.html. 
341 “NIMBY Protests: A Timeline of NIMBY Protests.” 
342 Samuel Wade, “Pipeline Project Cancelled After Protests,” China Digital Times (CDT), July 28, 2012, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/07/pipeline-project-cancelled-after-protests/; Perlez, “After Qidong Protests, China Cancels Waste Project.” 
343 Didi Tang, “China City Quashes Protest against Petro Plant,” Yahoo News, May 5, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/china-city-quashes-protest-
against-petro-plant-102654099.html. 
344 Linlin, “Japanese Paper Factory Center of Protest”; Wade, “Qidong Paper Plant Resumes Production.” 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
Oct-12 Yinggehai Hainan345 1,000+ Coal-fired power plant: air 
50 arrested; 100 injured; 
town placed under house 
arrest346 
Jun-12 Songjiang Shanghai347 Hundreds Waste Incineration construction: air  
Jul-12 Shifang Sichuan348 10,000 Copper molybdenum processing plant 
Construction paused after 
violent, bloody protests; 
13 injured;349 case study 
for government on “what 
went wrong”350 
Oct-12 Ningbo Zhejiang351 
4,000–
5,000 
Zhenhai district PX plant; air pollution; 
gov’t promises of subsidy 
Halted planned 
construction after violent 
weekend clash with 
police 
Nov-12 Wenzhou Zhejiang352 1,000+ High-voltage power lines  
                                                 
345 “Environmental Protests in China.” 
346 Xin Yu and Fung Yat-yiu, “Clashes Trigger Lockdown,” trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, October 22, 2012, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hainan-10222012105257.html. 
347 Wade, “Protests Win Written Pledge.” 
348 Anne Henochowicz, “Shifang: A Study in Contrasts,” China Digital Times (CDT), July 6, 2012, http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/07/shifang-a-
study-contrasts/; Branigan, “Anti-Pollution Protesters Halt Construction of Copper Plant in China”; Hao, “Shifang.” 
349 Keith Bradsher, “Chinese City Suspends Factory Construction Following Protests,” The New York Times, July 3, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/asia/chinese-city-suspends-factory-construction-following-protests.html; Yan Dingfei, “Shifang Deadlock Is 
a ‘National Problem’ for China,” Chinadialogue, November 10, 2014, https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/7470-Shifang-deadlock-is-
a-national-problem-for-China. 
350 Wade, “The Long Shadow of 2012’s Shifang Protests.” 
351 Samuel Wade, “PX Protests, Hollow Victories and Forced Demolitions,” China Digital Times (CDT), November 3, 2012, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2012/11/px-protests-hollow-victories-and-forced-demolitions/; Waldmeir, “China’s Pollution Time Bomb Highlighted”; 
Tang, “China Residents Protest Chemical Factory”; Waldmeir, Hook, and Anderlini, “Ningbo Protest, Response Both Typical.” 
352 Tao, “Villagers Clash With Police Over Proposed Power Plant, Flip Over Vehicles [VIDEO].” 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
May-13 Chengdu Sichuan353 100s PX 
Pre-emptively squashed 
by officials 
May-13 Kunming Yunan354 200–2000 PX  
May-13 Songjiang Shanghai355 100s Lithium Battery factory: soil 
Construction  
cancelled 
Jul-13 Jiangmen Guangdong356 <1,000 Uranium processing plant: soil 
Written pledge to scrap 
Villagers angry over  
loss of compensation 
after deal falls  
through357 
Jul-13 Huadu Guangdong358 100+ Waste Incinerator Dispersed peacefully 
Aug-13 Gangkou Jiangxi359 100+ 
Lead poisoning from lead recycling 
plant: soil 
Small, violent riot; 
protestors eventually 
dispersed 
Apr-14 Maoming Guangdong360 1,000+ PX 18 detained 
                                                 
353 “Hundreds of Chinese Protest against Chemical Plant.” 
354 Sophie Beach, “Protesters in Kunming and Chengdu Fight Pollution,” China Digital Times (CDT), May 4, 2013, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2013/05/protesters-in-kunming-and-chengdu-fight-pollution/; Chan, “Villagers angry at losing Jiangmen uranium plant 
deal.” 
355 Chan, “Villagers angry at losing Jiangmen uranium plant deal.” 
356 Josh Chin, “China Scraps Uranium Processing Plan After Protest,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2013, sec. World, 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324879504578602952150539208?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424127887324879504578602952150539208.html; Wade, “Protests Win Written 
Pledge”; Andrew Jacobs, “Rare Protest in China Against Uranium Plant Draws Hundreds,” New York Times, July 12, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/world/asia/rare-china-protest-against-uranium-plant-draws-hundreds.html. 
357 Chan, “Villagers angry at losing Jiangmen uranium plant deal.” 
358 Yang Fan, “Crowd Protests Planned Incinerator in China’s Guangdong Province,” trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, August 29, 2013, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/crowd-08292013112642.html. 
359 Xiaodong and Guoyao, “Locals Attack Factory in South-East China after Child Lead Poisonings.” 
360 “China Waste Plant Protest in Hangzhou ‘Injures Dozens.’” 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
Apr-14 Guangzhou Guangdong361 100s PX/ Maoming support  
Sep-14 Bolou County Guangdong362
3,000–
4,000 Waste Incineration 
Police hold 21363; plan to 
continue construction 
May-14 Hangzhou Zhejiang364 Hundreds? 





injured; 60+ detained 
Sep-14 Chongkuang Zhejiang365 30–40 Planned chemical plant: soil Protestors removed 
Sep-14 
Puyang, 
Dujiangyan Sichuan366 100+ 
Waste water treatment plant run-off 
(want relocation of plant) 
Police brutality; Effluent 
from the plant is now in 
line with national limits,” 
Original dataset compiled from listed footnotes. 
 
                                                 
361 Sevastopulo, “China PX Plant Protests Spread to Provincial Capital Guangzhou.” 
362 Beach, “Incinerator Protests Signal New Environmental Consciousness”; Buckley, “In Southern China, Residents Wary of the Government 
Protest a Plan to Burn Waste.” 
363 Wen Yuqing, Xin Lin, and Yang Fan, “Police Hold 21 After Waste Plant Protest in China’s Guangdong,” trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free 
Asia, September 15, 2014, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/waste-09152014142610.html. 
364 “China Waste Plant Protest in Hangzhou ‘Injures Dozens’”; Nan, Lik, and Fan, “Police Detain ‘At Least 10’ in Clashes With Pollution 
Protesters in China’s Guangdong”; Beach, “Incinerator Protests Signal New Environmental Consciousness”; Fan and Vandenbrink, “Dozens Held Over 
Violent Waste Incinerator Protest.” 




Figure 14.  Map of Industries 
 




Table 3.   Protests Data Points (2015) 
Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
Jan-15 Wuhan Hubei    
Apr-15 Luoding Guangdong367 1,000s Waste Incinerator—Air 
Local gov’t revoke 
permit 
Apr-15 Daying Village Guangdong368  
Mingfeng factory/ Iron foundry: air/ 
water  
Minority area/ 10 
detained 
Apr-15 Heyuan Guangdong369 10,000 Coal-fired power plant—Air  
2015 Zhangzhou Fujian370  
Explosion at Gulei PX plant (2nd in 2 
yrs.)—Air 15 injured 
Apr-15 Neijing City Sichuan371 1,000s 







Naimen Chemical Refinery Zone: 
Water/ Air pollution 
2,000 riot police 
deployed; 170 injured 
                                                 
367 Liu Xin, “Luoding Local Government Revokes Waste Incineration Project Permit,” Global Times, April 9, 2015, sec. Society, 
http://globaltimes.cn/content/915930.shtml; “China Incinerator Plan Cancelled after Protests,” BBC News, April 9, 2015, sec. Asia, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-32229589. 
368 Nan, Lik, and Fan, “Police Detain ‘At Least 10’ in Clashes With Pollution Protesters in China’s Guangdong.” 
369 John McGarrity, “Thousands Join Demo against Guangdong Coal-Fired Power Plant,” Chinadialogue, April 13, 2015, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/7843--Thousands-join-demo-against-Guangdong-coal-fired-power-plant-/en; Mimi Lau, “10,000 Protest in Chinese 
City over Planned Coal-Fired Power Plant,” South China Morning Post, accessed April 24, 2015, 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1765010/10000-protest-chinese-city-over-planned-coal-fired-power-plant. 
370 Qin, “Govt Assurances on PX.” 
371 Zhang Chun, “Residents of SW China City Protest against Foul Air,” Chinadialogue, April 15, 2015, 
https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/7844-Residents-of-SW-China-city-protest-against-foul-air/en; Lin Jing and Yang Fan, “Thousands Protest, Riot in 
China’s Sichuan After Coking Plant Leak,” trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, April 14, 2015, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/leak-
04142015103014.html. 
372 Qiao Long, Luo Bote, and Ren Ji, “Dozens Held After Pollution Protests in China’s Inner Mongolia,” trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, 
April 6, 2015, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/mongolia-protest-04062015103918.html. 
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Date City Province Numbers Issue Results 
May-15 Gegu Tianjin373 1,000+ Rongcheng Iron and Steel Factory: air  
Jun-15 Jinshan Shanghai374 10,000 PX; gov’t mistrust—Air 
Heavy police presence/ 
protestors moved from 
outside gov’t offices375; 
lack of social media 
commentary376 
Jul-15 Langfang Hebei377 2,000 
Waste Incinerator (told power plant, 
not what type)—Air  
Original dataset compiled from listed footnotes. 
  
                                                 
373 Fan and Yuqing, “Thousands Protest High Cancer Rates Linked to Pollution in China’s Tianjin.” 
374 Wei Ling and Wen Yuqing, “No Sign of Early End to Shanghai Protest Over Planned PX Plant,” trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, June 
26, 2015, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/plant-06262015133144.html. 
375 Paul Traynor, “Police in Shanghai Remove at Least 3 Busloads of Protesters Who Oppose Rumored Chemical Plant,” AP, June 27, 2015, 
Online edition, http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/06/27/chinese-city-of-shanghai-stymies-protest-over-chemical-plant. 
376 Angus Grigg, “What Happened to China’s Powerful Bloggers?,” Australian Financial Review, accessed July 14, 2015, 
http://www.afr.com/technology/social-media/how-china-stopped-its-bloggers-20150703-gi34za. 
377 Lin Jing, “Dozens Injured, 10 Detained in Clashes Over Waste Plant in China’s Hebei,” trans. Luisetta Mudie, Radio Free Asia, July 2, 2015, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/dozens-injured-10-detained-in-clashes-over-waste-plant-in-hebei-07022015104948.html. 
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Table 4.   Population and Economic Statistics 
 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook (2014), aggregated in excel 
  












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Median 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Median 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Avrg 2013 2013 2013 2013 2013
National Total 130756 131448 132129 132802 133450 134091 134735 135404 136072 32707
Guangdong 9194 9442 9660 9893 10130 10441 10505 10594 10644 10130 34.5 39.5 39.3 38.8 39.6 38 39.05 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.52 62163.97 36943 29427.49 27426.26 44.12
Zhejiang 4991 5072 5155 5212 5276 5447 5463 5477 5498 5276 29 30.7 31.1 31.7 33.4 33.4 31.4 3.7 3.3 3.2 3.1 3 3 3.22 37568.49 35302 18446.65 16368.43 43.57
Fujian 3557 3585 3612 3639 3666 3693 3720 3748 3774 3666 14.9 15.2 14.5 14.6 14.5 14.7 14.65 4 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.77 21759.64 36657 11315.3 9455.32 43.45
Sichuan 8212 8169 8127 8138 8185 8045 8050 8076 8107 8127 34.3 36.3 34.6 36.9 40.7 42.9 36.6 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.2 4 4.1 4.22 26260.77 29830 13579.03 11578.55 44.09
Hunan 6326 6342 6355 6380 6406 6570 6596 6639 6691 6406 41.9 47.8 43.2 43.1 44.1 45.6 43.65 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 24501.67 27637 11517.35 10001 40.82
Shanghai 1890 1964 2064 2141 2210 2303 2347 2380 2415 2210 27.5 27.9 27.6 27 26.7 25.3 27.25 4.3 4.4 3.5 3.1 4 3.22 21602.12 32828 8027.77 7236.69 33.50
Jiangsu 7588 7656 7723 7762 7810 7869 7899 7920 7939 7810 41.6 40.7 40.6 41.4 40.5 37.6 40.65 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3 3.22 59161.75 36308 29094.03 25612.24 43.29
Yunnan 4450 4483 4514 4543 4571 4602 4631 4659 4687 4571 13 15.4 15.7 16 17.4 18.1 15.85 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.1 4 4 4.13 11720.91 26738 4927.82 3767.58 32.14
Liaoning 4221 4271 4298 4315 4341 4375 4383 4389 4390 4341 60.4 41.6 38.9 39.4 38.1 39.6 39.5 5.6 3.9 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.97 27077.65 30233 14269.46 12510.27 46.20
Jiangxi 4311 4339 4368 4400 4432 4462 4488 4504 4522 4432 22.8 27.3 26.3 24.6 25.7 27.4 26 3.5 3.4 3.3 3 3 3.2 3.23 14338.5 27819 7671.38 6434.41 44.88
Hainan 828 836 845 854 864 869 877 887 895 864 5.1 5.3 4.8 2.9 3.6 3.9 4.35 3.6 3.5 3 1.7 2 2.2 2.67 3146.46 30002 871.29 551.11 17.52
Guangxi 4660 4719 4768 4816 4856 4610 4645 4682 4719 4719 18.5 19.1 19.1 18.8 18.9 18 18.85 4.2 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.63 14378 28508 6863.04 5749.65 39.99
Shaanxi 3690 3699 3708 3718 3727 3735 3743 3753 3764 3727 21.5 21.5 21.4 20.9 19.5 21.1 21.25 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.6 3.2 3.3 3.68 16045.21 26454 8911.64 7507.34 46.79
Beijing 1538 1601 1676 1771 1860 1962 2019 2069 2115 1860 10.6 8.2 7.7 8.1 8.1 7.5 8.1 2.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.47 19500.56 48027 4352.3 3536.89 18.14
Tianjin 1043 1075 1115 1176 1228 1299 1355 1413 1472 1228 11.7 15 16.1 20.1 20.4 21.7 18.1 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.62 14370.16 41975 7276.68 6678.6 46.48
Hebei 6851 6898 6943 6989 7034 7194 7241 7288 7333 7034 27.8 34.5 35.1 36 36.8 37.2 35.55 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.82 28301.41 28135 14762.1 13194.76 46.62
Hubei 5710 5693 5699 5711 5720 5728 5758 5779 5799 5720 52.6 55.3 55.7 55.1 42.3 40.2 53.85 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 3.8 3.5 4.02 24668.49 25898 12171.56 10531.37 42.69
Inner Mongolia 2403 2415 2429 2444 2458 2472 2482 2490 2498 2458 17.7 20.1 20.8 21.8 23.1 23.8 21.3 4.3 4 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.9 16832.38 33245 9084.19 7944.4 47.20
Shanxi 3355 3375 3393 3411 3427 3574 3593 3611 3630 3427 14.3 21.6 20.4 21.1 21 21.1 21.05 3 3.9 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.4 12602.24 27580 6792.68 6032.99 47.87
Heilongjiang 3820 3823 3824 3825 3826 3833 3834 3834 3835 3826 31.3 31.4 36.2 35 41.3 41.4 35.6 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.28 14382.93 24750 5918.22 5090.34 35.39
Guizhou 3730 3690 3632 3596 3537 3479 3469 3484 3502 3537 12.1 12.3 12.2 12.5 12.6 13.7 12.4 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.63 8006.79 29370 3243.7 2686.52 33.55
Anhui 6120 6110 6118 6135 6131 5957 5968 5988 6030 6110 27.8 30.1 26.9 33.1 31.3 32.4 30.7 4.4 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.8 19038.87 30872 10403.96 8928.02 46.89
Jilin 2716 2723 2730 2734 2740 2747 2749 2750 2751 2740 27.6 23.4 22.7 22.2 22.3 22.6 22.65 4.2 4 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.85 12981.46 24244 6858.23 6033.35 46.48
Chongqing 2798 2808 2816 2839 2859 2885 2919 2945 2970 2859 16.9 13.4 13 13 12.4 12.1 13 4.1 4 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.7 12656.69 35666 6397.92 5249.65 41.48
Shandong 9248 9309 9367 9417 9470 9588 9637 9685 9733 9470 42.9 45.1 44.5 45.1 43.4 42.2 43.95 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.33 54684.33 34317 27422.47 24222.16 44.29
Henan 9380 9392 9360 9429 9487 9405 9388 9406 9413 9405 33 38.5 38.2 38.4 38.3 40.2 38.35 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.1 3.1 3.33 32155.86 23936 17806.39 15960.6 49.64
Gansu 2545 2547 2548 2551 2555 2560 2564 2578 2582 2555 9.3 10.3 10.7 10.8 9.8 9.3 10.05 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.98 6268.01 24334 2821.04 2225.22 35.50
Qinghai 543 548 552 554 557 563 568 573 578 557 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.15 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.67 2101.05 26226 1204.31 970.53 46.19
Tibet 280 285 289 292 296 300 303 308 312 296 2 2.1 1 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.8 4 3.2 2.6 2.5 2.68 807.67 n/a 292.92 61.16 7.57
Ningxia 596 604 610 618 625 633 639 647 654 625 4.4 4.8 4.8 5.2 4.6 4.7 4.75 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.33 2565.06 32097 1264.96 944.5 36.82
Xinjiang 2010 2050 2095 2131 2159 2185 2209 2233 2264 2159 11.1 11.9 11 11.1 11.8 11.9 11.45 3.9 3.8 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.48 8360.24 33409 3765.97 3024.27 36.17
*“Secondary industry refers to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and gas, and construction.”
Unemployed PersonsPopulation Unemployment Rate (%)
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Table 5.   Protests by Location and Year 
 
Numbers aggregated from Table 2. 
  
Region
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
6 1 2 4 10 1 4 7 6 6 9 47
Guangdong 3 1 2 3 3 9
Zhejiang 4 1 2 2 9
Fujian 1 1 1 4 1 7
Sichuan 1 1 1 1 1 4
Hunan 2 2 4
Shanghai 1 1 1 1 1 4








Tianjin 1 1 1
Hebei 0 0
Hubei 1 0














2015 numbers not included in final totals
Protests (2005-2015)
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Table 6.   Protests by Size and Year 
 
Numbers aggregated from Table 2. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
0‐100 1 3 1 5
100‐999 2 1 3 2 1 1 5 3 18
1,000‐9,999 1 1 4 1 1 5 1 2 4 20
10,000+ 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 8
2015 numbers not included in final totals
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